Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web traffic for two hours

Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by tialaramex on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @07:40PM (#16917631)

The TLS WG is currently haggling about, effectively, DANE's future. The thing up in the air was, should this technology for saying "Hi, I can do DANE" be pinned? e.g. a client sees "I can do DANE" and it says to itself "OK, I will now expect DANE certificates from this TLS service for... 24 hours? 10 minutes? 10 years? An amount of time defined in some new parameter?" Or maybe it never does this. Last I looked at the thread, it seemed like "Never do this, make yet another TLS extension to specify if you want pinning" is the choice of the working group.

(The reason this isn't an application header like HSTS is that DANE advocates want to bake this into TLS itself, so that it works without needing new application features in every single TLS-using application)

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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by tptacek on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @08:31PM (#16917858)

The TLS WG can haggle about DANE all it wants, but DANE is a dead letter: it was tried in two of the four major browsers and failed, and a third (Safari) briefly had nascent framework support for it and jettisoned it. Without support from the browser vendors, DANE is irrelevant.

The big problem Chrome had with DANE was that they couldn't (and presumably still can't) assume reliable DNSSEC/DANE record lookups. If you can't fail closed with DANE, then all DANE really is is another CA; attackers can "strip" DANE from connections, trivially, and be exactly where they are today. Meanwhile, end-users pay the price in latency and reduced performance for a cosmetic security improvement that most people don't care about.

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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by tialaramex on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @08:37PM (#16917887)

So, you should not be surprised (but perhaps you are anyway) that how to work around not having DNSSEC on end systems is exactly what this work was about. Specifically, the idea is you shove DNSSEC RRs into TLS. Now the client doesn't need working DNSSEC, because the DNSSEC records were delivered with the connection. Hence the pinning question.

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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by raldi on Wednesday April 25, 2018 @09:10AM (#16921182)

There's also https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4956 , which allows a domain to sign that a range of DNS entries does not exist; under this system, a client resolver could demand cryptographic proof that a domain was missing certain records, which stops the MitM RR-stripping attack.

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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by tptacek on Wednesday April 25, 2018 @11:04AM (#16922131)

You're describing authenticated denial, which has been a characteristic of DNSSEC since 1994.

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Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra... by raldi on Wednesday April 25, 2018 @11:26AM (#16922370)

Yes, exactly. The RFC I linked to specifically refers to Authenticated Denial in the Security Considerations section.

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