Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra...
by cft on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @06:36PM
(#16917263)
Wait: in example.com say .com registrar sets a 5min TTL on NS record for example.com that resolves to 1.2.3.4. That means that your DNS server is at 1.2.3.4, serving your A and MX records. An attacker BGP hijacks 1.2.3.4. You change NS record in your .com registrar settings to 5.6.7.8 that is not compromised. Notice I am not talking about your A or MX records that you controlled on a compromised IP, but of NS record that a .com registrar controls. So after 5 min the browsers contact a non-compromised nameserver at 5.6.7.8 to get your A records.
I think unless a TLD registrar gets hijacked that mitigates the attack on your own DNS after the NS TTL
Re:Hijack of Amazon’s domain service used to reroute web tra...
by rocqua on Tuesday April 24, 2018 @06:44PM
(#16917332)
You are right, I was thinking of a different attack. Something like a BGP-hijack of 8.8.8.8 , 1.1.1.1 or similar often used DNS resolvers.
Here though, people using area53 for DNS probably can't move away from it as they are stuck on amazon.
There is no strong defense against this as a website. With an app the solution would be certificate pinning. You could try HPKP but that comes with a host of issues and I think it is being deprecated.