"“Having a bank, it’s a sign of economic vitality,” he says. And it’s not just North Carolina. He notes the country has about 40 percent fewer banks today than when the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, passed in response to the recession and implementing the most significant changes to financial regulations since the Great Depression, was signed in 2010.
Proponents of the measure said it would reduce the risk of another financial crisis by decreasing the concentration of resources in a handful of banks. Gwaltney says it’s done “the exact opposite.”
“The five or 10 largest banks in the country are larger than they were at the passage of Dodd-Frank,” he says."
[0] https://banksstreetpartners.com/news/what-happened-to-our-co...
Then you can look at the CDO crisis less than ten years later and talk about correlation not being causation until you're blue in the face.
Here's another prediction: the destruction of the CFSB will lead to anti-consumer behavior at large banks.
It doesn't help that the people who are best able to write the regulations are those who are in the industry: they also have incentive to get it wrong. Either you have people who don't understand the industry writing the regulations despite not being competent to do so, and thus not realizing at all what the loopholes are; or you get those who are inside to close the bad loop holes (the ones they know will be abused and they will get in trouble for) while opening up smaller loopholes that benefit slightly them at the expense of someone else not writing the regulations. Either way you lose, though insiders is slightly better. This is also why you see a "revolving door" between industry and regulators: that is the only way regulators can get the skills they need to write something that isn't completely awful.
Yes but why is the burden asymmetric? It is similarly impossible to predict the consequences of deregulation ahead of time yet proponents of deregulation are never held to the total unpredictability of the outcomes of their position.
I will partially counter that a much simpler class of regulations can cover more things in deregulation.
For example, if I just make fraud illegal, if you misrepresent what your evil I don't care what it is under deregulation I can get you. If you are honest about your evil it will be harder (but not impossible!) to sell it.
Deregulation also allows the "small guy" a better chance because to compete, and so with more choice the customer is likely to be more aware of choice.
Again, the above is not complete. There are big holes in this as well. Fundamentally there are always a subset of people who are willing to do evil to get ahead, if they can do their evil while being in the letter of the law they will. Society needs a way to deal with it, and nothing is perfect.
What's an example of this? The deregulation of airlines? The repeal of Glass-Steagall? I've read a lot of bad takes about the latter's supposed outcomes, but none of them claimed that the outcome was unpredictable.
It depends on what you mean by 'outcome.' If by outcome you mean that with GLBA/Glass-Steagall repeal banks began investing in the products they had previously been barred from then sure that was predictable. If we mean second order effects like it's possible contribution to the financial crisis then I'd say that was definitely unpredictable considering economists still can't agree on whether GLBA played a role or not.
What Obama should have done during the crisis is nationalize the failing big banks instead of bailing them out and then broken them down into a hundred little banks and sold them off.
George W. Bush presided over the crisis, despite what conservative media pundits would have you believe. It's amazing how this has been largely ret-conned for half the US population. We live in, uh, interesting times.
Also, I would guess with more competition from smaller banks, megabanks might actually act more responsibly.
[EDIT] but you are kind of proving my point, so thanks! I said "deregulation" so your mind is already made up on the point.