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Re:Google disables “domain fronting” capability used to evad... by icebraining on Friday April 20, 2018 @03:15AM (#16882757)
SNI is used to allow the frontend gateway to select the correct certificate; it should be harder to block if the frontend gateway instead had a single certificate with all the domains it proxied (obviating the need for SNI).

Of course, that means the gateway must terminate the TLS connection for every site (and therefore be able to read its contents), whereas with SNI it could redirect the TLS connection itself to the appropriate server, while being unable to spy on it.

In practice what happened before SNI is that every SSL/TLS site used a dedicated IP, which makes it quite easy to block.

Re:Google disables “domain fronting” capability used to evad... by StavrosK on Friday April 20, 2018 @06:27AM (#16883622)
I meant something more like encrypted SNI in TLS 1.3[1], but that has covering as an explicit design goal, so I guess that answers my question.

Still, it's a matter of politics, and not of technology. Google here chooses to stop covering for Telegram/Signal, even if the technology allows it.

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tls-8.p...