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Re:The Encryption Debate Isn't About Stopping Terrorists, It... by pjc50 on Monday April 09, 2018 @03:41PM (#16796271)
My proposal for this, which I doubt either side would support, I call the "piggybank protocol". It has four key elements:

- hardware key storage, iphone/TPM style

- mechanism for the manufacturer to authorise key release from a device

- important 1: this process should be irreversibly tamper-evident, such as IC "fuses" or one-time PROM. This should be permanently visible in the UI, so it cannot be applied invisibly.

- important 2: an obligation on the state to pay for replacement devices which have been compromised in the previous step but not used in court. This is to prevent it being routineised.

Re:The Encryption Debate Isn't About Stopping Terrorists, It... by cesarb on Monday April 09, 2018 @04:28PM (#16796684)
How would tamper evidence help if the device is stolen?

If nobody but me has the device encryption key, and my device is stolen, I can be sure that nobody will have access to whatever data it contains. If anybody else has the device encryption key, however, and the device is stolen, I can no longer know whether anybody else had access to the data, no matter how much tamper evidence the device has.