You're again missing the entire point of this conversation.

Yes, the evidence was clear in the case of the CIO, and everything worked as it should in the case of that one person. But as craigc noted, three other executives managed to sell shares before the price drop, so there's a question of how likely those three were to have known about the situation but by chance happened to have no clear evidence against them. That leads to the question of what can be done to more effectively prevent executives from engaging in insider trading in situations where they are aware that the evidence will be too scant to prosecute. One solution proposed was to zero the transactions of stock sales by executives that occurred shortly before an event like this. Saying "the stock price will take care of it" makes no sense in this context.

I don't think we can fix the lack of evidence by lowering the standard of proof.

If you wanted to advocate stronger reporting requirements for what executives knew and when then I'd be more comfortable.

But my point is that if we implement a policy to rollback but otherwise not punish executives who sell stock right before an event like this (notwithstanding any actual other crimes related to insider trading that could be prosecuted separately; for example tipping someone off), the standard of proof becomes irrelevant.

Personally, I think the solution is to not allow executives to sell stock without publishing a schedule in which the first sale is more than 9 months from the date of the announced schedule.