HR 5011, rather than trying to cobble together a bandaid over hackable electronic voting systems, has its central mitigation the voting system problem (it addresses more election infrastructure than just ballot-casting) incentives and grants to get rid of electronic voting altogether in favor of the proven system of voter-marked paper ballots. Voter-marked ballots that are the thing that is counted in the normal case is much better than voter-verified receipts that are selectively or conditionally used to audit counts, and open source is irrelevant when there is no software, and the idea that open source is somehow equivalent to secure has been refuted time and again.
Now, sure, it arguably [0] wouldn't be bad to add something like HR 5147s requirements for hold-outs that aren't going to abandon electronic voting into HR 5011, and that would be a very good debate to have when HR 5011 (or, more realistically, the similar bill introduced in the next Congress) is heard in committee.
[0] Arguably not, though, because that could encourage people to see electronic voting as safer than it is; maybe better would be to amend in a hard deadline requirement for abandoning electronic voting in favor of voter-marked paper ballots, a stick to go along with the grant-money carrot.