Re:Breaking the Ledger Security Model
by limpkin on Tuesday March 20, 2018 @11:32AM
(#16629421)
Disclosure: I'm the creator of Mooltipass.
When creating the Mooltipass offline password keeper we actually spent a considerable amount of time thinking about solutions for the particular problem explained on this website.
We therefore opted for the following techniques:
- only allow signed firmware updates, signed using an encryption key unique to each device
- given that firmware flashing using external programmers requires complete flash/eeprom erase, we implemented a challenge/response protocol to check for tampering during shipping.
Obviously things are way easier when you don't allow custom firmwares to be flashed on a device. But as a general rule I wouldn't trust a device that would allow other programs to run on it (eg phones, computers...)
When creating the Mooltipass offline password keeper we actually spent a considerable amount of time thinking about solutions for the particular problem explained on this website.
We therefore opted for the following techniques:
- only allow signed firmware updates, signed using an encryption key unique to each device
- given that firmware flashing using external programmers requires complete flash/eeprom erase, we implemented a challenge/response protocol to check for tampering during shipping.
Obviously things are way easier when you don't allow custom firmwares to be flashed on a device. But as a general rule I wouldn't trust a device that would allow other programs to run on it (eg phones, computers...)