Well, the two procedures that get my goat are: (1) everybody take off your shoes because one guy tried to blow up his shoe ten years ago; (2) the asinine rules around liquids and gels because some nutcases in the UK were chattering about JITting themselves some explosives but never actually got close to figuring out how. Both of these rules seem premised on the idea that terrorists are clever enough to come up with those diabolical schemes, but too stupid to concoct any new ones, so we can just plug yesterday's holes. Since that's obviously dumb, who are the rules really designed for? Who else but the general public? They (we) are the ones who heard about those plots and in whose minds the images stuck. In other words: security theater. Note also that the most recent such dude tried to blow up his underwear, yet no rules involving underwear have been promulgated. Why the inconsistency? Public sensibility: we're willing to tolerate our shoes being inspected but not our panties. It's difficult otherwise to explain why the security repertoire should be organized around something terrorists did 10 years ago rather than what they did 6 months ago.

Someone (Schneier?) said that two things have contributed to genuine security post-9/11: locked cockpits and passenger alertness. I've heard a number of airline industry people say the same thing, e.g. that pilot guy who writes for Slate. This makes sense to me. But what do I know? I'm just a guy who stands in the line fuming at the stupidity of it all, reminding myself to breathe deeply and not say anything sarcastic lest I get hauled off to the back room.

They had airport security right back in 2000. All they need to do is go back to doing things that way and everybody will be a lot happier.

Back in 2000, Hijacking an airplane meant that you landed it someplace, demanded some stuff, let the passengers off, then got killed by the police. Passengers knew that all they needed to do was sit tight and things would work themselves out. That's the reason why a bunch of dudes could hijack a plane with silly little utility knives. In the passenger's mind, it sucked, but they figured they'd live through it.

Nowadays, if the TSA lets me keep my fingernail clippers and I attempt to take over the plane with them, I'll get 185 people jumping on me because they expect me to crash it into something.

That's the fundamental thing that changed after 9/11. The upside of it is that it's now next to impossible to hijack a commercial flight, even if you're armed. The natural conclusion then, from a security perspective, is not to start confiscating my bottled water, but rather to continue with the straightforward, effective security that was already working.

Two biggest threats to airliners are guns (for taking over the plane) and bombs (for blowing them up). Metal detecters, bomb dogs and maybe armed flight crews (we do this now) are really all that's needed to deal with all of those.

The current setup is all about $M's that security contractors get for high-end scanning equipment (as opposed to dogs that can be trained for $50K).

If you think sniffer > dogs, I have a shooting bag (complete with recent burns from muzzle flash) I take as my duffle, and it's been through the sniffer and nothing was detected. It's easy to imagine a hermetically sealed large laptop battery with explosives to bring a plane down. The people who did 9/11 were engineers, they could figure it out...

We're no more safe than we were, but the chances are VERY slim to be killed yourself. We're better fighting heart disease than airplane terrorism.

Concrete suggestions: 1. Accept profiling as a legitimate tactic. 2. Open up the airports closed to general aviation post-9/11. 3. Reduce the time spent outside the secure area, partially for the convenience and efficient use of passenger's time, but more importantly to prevent the massing of people in a confined space, subject to attack by trivially prepared terrorists. You could do a signficant amount of damage in the average security line, and your preparation required would be measured in hours or days, not months/years. With a poison gas attack, you wouldn't even have to die yourself, though perhaps that misses the point for some terrorists?

Frankly, keeping the guns and knives confined to checked baggage, and making it possible to get from Boston to NYC door to door faster than the train, and you're on to something. I believe we've gotten to the point where we're exposing the travelling public to a higher rather than lower level of risk by the current security measures.

The cost-benefit analysis is a very good point. That's precisely where aviation security goes wrong; it overspends on ineffective procedures and very expensive equipment for negligible increases in security, because things as simple as as large bottles marked "saline solution" are allowed to go through untested.

bureaucrats have a vested interest in the chaos in which they exist.

And power over the populace has many uses, not the least of which is creating a culture of cowed people unwilling to resist e latest edicts.

Two words. El Al. There hasn't been a successful attack in decades. Not cause they are such a small target but because they don't fuck around with their security and everyone knows it. When I fly El Al and they put me through the ringer, I know they are not wasting my time. When I fly non El Al I know that it's all kabuki theater.

Take, for example, the two degenerates who recently flew from Detroit to Schippol (Amsterdam, I believe. sp? On an iphone). Those dry run jokers got to Europe and were caught there. Um, why weren't they caught here before they could... You know... Kaboom the plane? The examples are endless.

How would you design security procedures? ... What about seriously toned down security like we have been doing for decades prior to 911 and just accepting that once in a while a plane gets blown up?

I think this article http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/744199---israelifi... comprehensively explains what is infective and gives plenty of constructive suggestions. Namely because the method described is already in use and has not had any problems.