I've consulted ip6(4) but I'm still unclear on exactly why they break with the rfc here. Do you know where they detail the security implications?
>However, RFC2553 does not define the ordering constraint between calls to
bind(2), nor how IPv4 TCP/UDP port numbers and IPv6 TCP/UDP port numbers
relate to each other (should they be integrated or separated). Imple-
mented behavior is very different from kernel to kernel. Therefore, it
is unwise to rely too much upon the behavior of AF_INET6 wildcard bind
sockets. It is recommended to listen to two sockets, one for AF_INET and
another for AF_INET6, when you would like to accept both IPv4 and IPv6
traffic.
>It should also be noted that malicious parties can take advantage of the
complexity presented above, and are able to bypass access control, if the
target node routes IPv4 traffic to AF_INET6 socket. Users are advised to
take care handling connections from IPv4 mapped address to AF_INET6 sock-
ets.
(emphasis mine)
AFAIK, on many systems (think FreeBSD) this is not true:
https://www.unix.com/man-page/FreeBSD/4/inet6/
> By default, FreeBSD does not route IPv4 traffic to AF_INET6 sockets. The default behavior intentionally violates RFC2553 for security reasons. Listen to two sockets if you want to accept both IPv4 and IPv6 traffic. IPv4 traffic may be routed with certain per-socket/per-node configuration, however, it is not recommended to do so. Consult ip6(4) for details.