The IETF's BCP#188 document is one of many consequences of Snowden, its title is "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", and the text begins "Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible".

Almost literally right now, IETF 101 is starting in London, and one of the things presented will be a series of proposals by people who claim they (or organisations they work for, the IETF is only for people, corporations can't participate they can just send people to it) have a legitimate reason to snoop on TLS traffic. TLS 1.3 is designed, following BCP#188, to make such snooping impossible without ongoing assistance from one of the endpoints (if the endpoint is co-operating with the snooping there's mathematically nothing anybody can do) and they would dearly like to return to an era when they could snoop with just a little one time assistance. Now, maybe this would have been stiffly resisted anyway, but BCP#188 means anybody who isn't sure has an existing IETF document telling them exactly why this is a terrible idea.