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Re:Our Interesting Call with CTS-Labs by tptacek on Thursday March 15, 2018 @10:15PM (#16598086)
If you have admin access to these machines, you can persist into the secure coprocessor. In the presence of these vulnerabilities, it is actually worse to have a secure coprocessor than not to have one at all. They are serious vulnerabilities; about the worst you can have in an enclave scheme. If SGX had a comparable problem, it would be headline news.

Does that mean the stock should head to zero, like some crazy prop trading firm claimed they should? The fuck should I know? I am cynical about the impact vulnerabilities have on stock prices and don't think consumers generally care.

Re:Our Interesting Call with CTS-Labs by ComputerGuru on Thursday March 15, 2018 @10:20PM (#16598107)
I’m with you, but again, context. A compromised machine used to be a hosed machine until you reinitialized the drive and started clean. People are just starting to wake up to the fact that there’s another computer in your computer to which the same maxims apply.

Anyone that is serious about security hopefully knows this.

(I have no skin in the AMD/Intel CPU game. Too many machines running both to bother. I can’t believe I have to say this on HN, it’s what I’d expect of [H]ard in 2004.)

Re:Our Interesting Call with CTS-Labs by MertsA on Friday March 16, 2018 @08:14AM (#16600078)
The thing that gets me is that they are simultaneously making claims that some of those vulnerabilities can't just be fixed with a quick firmware update and that they would allow for a backdoor that could never be removed. If the flaw that allows the attacker to overwrite the firmware with their own version can't be fixed in software then how exactly is the malicious firmware supposed to prevent its own removal?

One of those claims has to be false. If an attacker can shut the door behind them so to speak then it has to be possible for AMD to do the same.

Re:Our Interesting Call with CTS-Labs by fencepost on Thursday March 15, 2018 @11:27PM (#16598366)
Persistence is a big deal, but I can't help but feel a certain level of "meh" because my gut feeling is that persistence is a lot more useful in espionage and state actors than in the kind of business environments I deal with.

Maybe this is going to be the next big thing thrown into Metasploit so it can be easily used to make persistent something that's effective on a variety of systems with a variety of environments and data while still being subtle enough to avoid having the infection vector code make it into every AV package out there, but I doubt it.

To me the use of this kind of exploit feels like a very fine needle. Very fine needles are very very useful in a lot of specific situations, but very fine needles scattered haphazardly around the environment are a very different thing.