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Re:Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power P... by closeparen on Thursday March 15, 2018 @08:45PM (#16597760)
Have you ever tried to retroactively lock down a running system that was designed by people completely oblivious to software security?

It’s hard enough with non-safety-critical, pure-software systems. Industrial systems with life-safety implications and release cycles measured in decades cannot be made secure against nation-state adversaries at the drop of a hat.

The United States has never tried to bomb-proof every building. Our military strategy is our capability to bomb you right back a thousand times over. Attribution and offensive capabilities will be a lot more important to military strategists accustomed to that mindset.

Re:Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power P... by jessaustin on Friday March 16, 2018 @10:32AM (#16600893)
I haven't, and clearly that's a major factor. However... decades-old industrial systems didn't come from the factory with connectivity. Either we're talking about stuxnet-style USB stuff in which case don't do that or this is a network connection that was added later as part of some project. Now it's time for another project to secure or remove those connections. This will cost money, but no power company is shy about going to the PUC for rate increases.

One reason we have to do this work instead of just warning the world "if our power plants get hacked we're going to war" is that the world in general has no way to judge our claims about hacks we may or may not have suffered. In contrast, if our buildings get bombed that's kind of obvious. We don't have a great deal of credibility when it comes to war justifications, just based on recent form.

Re:Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power P... by closeparen on Saturday March 17, 2018 @10:02PM (#16610119)
My understanding is that grid has always been networked. Before we had computers talking to each other, we had control-room operators with telephones. That is also subject to eavesdropping, denial-of-service, and social engineering.

I agree we need to fix it, but I'm not surprised that it's slow going or ineffective. Likely we're going to see some very expensive projects to merely install antivirus packages, where what we really needed was to engineer completely different protocols.