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Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by adumbledore on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @04:20AM (#16574507)
The article doesn't actually talk about preventing injection attacks, but rather identifying potential attack surfaces by doing an AST search for eval/exec in combination with mutable variables. The article does not explain what limitations exist for their runtime check:

> This results in 5 false positives (out of 56 benign inputs), which are caused by limitations of the static analysis (3/5) or node types outside of the safe set (2/5).

Besides that, it's good to see more security tools - especially when the research is open source: https://github.com/sola-da/Synode

Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by wesleytodd on Monday March 12, 2018 @10:36PM (#16573526)
Re-writing dependency source files with another dependency is a much worse idea than vetting your dependencies before you add them to your project IMHO
Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by calibas on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @01:06AM (#16573966)
If the only other solution is creating your own custom version of a vulnerable dependency, I can see how this could be useful. Not the "best" solution, but certainly practical as far as making code more secure.
Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by jessaustin on Monday March 12, 2018 @10:54PM (#16573599)
Maybe there's a setting to roll back the install if it finds vulnerable dependencies, rather than trying to fix them?
Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by orf on Monday March 12, 2018 @08:56PM (#16573067)
Everything old is new again. Just when you thought we where done with all the PHP injection madness...
Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by devwinportable on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @03:55AM (#16574437)
why not add an android-style permission flags on nodeJS?

eg) nodejs profile with:

- exec disabled

- file write access limited to ./tmp, ./docs, ./tests

- file read access limited to ./tmp, ./docs

- network listening: port 1000~11000 allowed

And why not have a 'sesame points' system for dependencies?

eg)

- ownership-change within 3 weeks: -20 points,

- static analysis finds something wrong: -20 points

- badges: 'file-read badge', 'exec-badge', etc.

Re:Synode: understanding and automatically preventing inject... by mAritz on Tuesday March 13, 2018 @06:48AM (#16575066)
Isn't the first part of your suggestion handled on OS level anyways? Aka. restricted user access, SELinux, AppArmor etc.