I won't argue it's right or wrong, actually. It's a choice, with different threat models driving different conclusions. Defining the failure modes with respect to security risks is a fraught business, and I hope Microsoft put a great deal of thought into it and has far more visibility into the risks than I. But it's what they appear to do, and we live in their world.
I argued elsewhere (in a late, top-level comment somewhere) that - if this is Windows's failure mode - MS should provide tools for devs to integrate into their build process that flags risky or mis-configured signature scenarios. This is too complicated, and used by too many non-security experts, with extreme failure modes, for it to be half-ass-able or easily done wrong.
And now you leave open an attack surface of "forge a signature off an old, expired cert and then fool the OS into thinking it's been installed all along."
Are you arguing that already-installed drivers should no longer be trusted? I can't tell.
If a cert expires at time T, the usual assumption is that forging signatures before T is not feasible (otherwise the expiration was poorly chosen), while forging signatures after T might be feasible.
If it's after T and we see a new update, we don't know whether the signature was crafted before or after T, so we should assume the latter and reject it.
But if we've already installed a driver, then we must have received its signature before T, otherwise we wouldn't have installed it at the time. So we should still continue to trust it after T.