Re:How not to run a CA
by cesarb on Thursday March 01, 2018 @02:49PM
(#16495512)
The remaining 27k certificates are probably the ones which were generated on and which never left the customer's premises. The only thing which could be siphoned in these cases is the CSR, which is harmless (it contains essentially the same info as the certificate, which is public).
[ Parent
| on HN ]
If the server was rooted, couldn't an attacker silently intercept and swap out a csr with their own during domain validation, and thus get certificates approved based on fraudulent csr where the corresponding private keys are controlled by the attacker? Maybe even throw in a few "oops, please retry validation" to hide the fact that a different public key was signed in the certificate and the real customer would be none the wiser (except for perhaps looking at CT logs)?
No. The CSR is tied to the key and the resulting certificate as well. Verifying that the CSR belongs to the key would be he CAs job, not the servers. If the server was rooted, an attacker could probably just use it to create an arbitrary new certificate - but revoking the legitimate cert won’t fix that.
1. User validates domain and submits csr
2. Rootkit swaps out csr with one of its own whose private key is under its control and submits upstream to the CA
3. CA signs a cert because the domain was validated
4. Rootkit receives valid cert for its own private key
5. Rootkit presents a bogus error to enduser
6. Enduser tries again and rootkit lets it through
End-result: there are now two certs and private keys for the domain, one of which is compromised?
Just a though experiment. I'm not familiar with the domain validation flow this reseller site was using.
Like I said: If you compromise the Trustico servers which are a reseller, you could trick the CA into believing that a CSR is valid for a domain. This would get you a certificate with a key under your control. But revoking the certificate with the key under the owners control won’t fix this. The illegitimate certificate would still be under the attackers control and remain valid.
Unless you revoke all the certs issued through that channel/reseller - the legitimates would be collateral damage but you'd also get rid of any illegitimate ones?
If you compromised the reseller, would you have the reseller keep a list of illegitimate certificates that you issued via that channel?
Surely the actual CA has a database of certificates it has issued and by which reseller?
1. Rootkit issues cert and sends to hacker
I find this plan to be much much easier.
Presumably, even if you had root on the reseller website, you would need to wait for the domain owner to actually perform a domain validation before the actual CA's system would deliver any certificates?
Considering the security on that website, probably not.
Even if you did, I would argue that if you have root access to the validation form, getting a certificate signed is not going to be exponentially harder either.
Waiting for a potential target to sign a cert using that specific reseller is just borderline useless.
An attacker of a CA will be interested in either their CA private key (or intermediary) or the ability to get arbitrary certs signed.
Random targets on the internet are useless since it's unlikely they can MitM them.
Certificate transparency logs would out that pretty quickly.
Re:How not to run a CA
by wolfgang42 on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:27PM
(#16496513)
Wouldn't that attack mean that the cert the domain owner got wouldn't work on their webserver, since they didn't have the correct private key for it?