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Re:How not to run a CA by TheDong on Thursday March 01, 2018 @01:57PM (#16494983)
ssh is, by default, Trust on First Use which is a significantly different model than a Trusted Thirdparty (CAs).

There are some well known trade-offs, namely that having everyone manually verify fingerprints on initial connect and again on any server change is a large burden.

I don't particularly want to have to go into my bank's local office and verify in person the fingerprint is correct each time they need to rotate a secret.

If this isn't what you meant, that we should use TOFU vs Trusted third party, please do expand.

Re:How not to run a CA by slrz on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:31PM (#16496562)
They could just put the relevant information on all their communications, your credit card, statements and so on, also accounting for future rotations.

For banks, it could work quite well. Most other people and organizations aren't that lucky, though.

Re:How not to run a CA by thriftwy on Thursday March 01, 2018 @02:03PM (#16495041)
I think it works much better for contacts. You have to verify contact once and then you are assured that it's still the same person.
Re:How not to run a CA by teraflop on Thursday March 01, 2018 @02:37PM (#16495392)
> You have to verify contact once

Only if users never replace their keys, which puts them at significant risk in the event of a key compromise.

Re:How not to run a CA by slrz on Thursday March 01, 2018 @04:35PM (#16496595)
Replace your key by signing a message announcing your new key?
Re:How not to run a CA by Manozco on Thursday March 01, 2018 @07:35PM (#16497783)
If your key is compromised, anyone can send that message and sign it with your key... :)