Re:Spreading Hayek, Spurning Keynes
by hga on Tuesday August 31, 2010 @09:02AM
(#1649205)
I agree with the nearly all of your points including most especially the moral hazard point: the bailout of Bear Sterns appears to have encouraged complacency on the part of Lehman Brothers and holders of their debt. One of the latter, the Reserve Primary Fund (a pioneer in the field which had been boasting about the quality of the assets they held), "broke the buck" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Money_market_fund#Breaking_the_...) and as far as I can tell that started a cascading failure of the world's financial system and my approval of intervention at that point and only that point is based on this.
I agree that discovering the new price is not a calamity, my argument is narrowly limited to keeping the financial system going so that process can happen in a orderly fashion. The Great Depression in the US was immeasurably worse due to all the bank failures triggered by this sort of thing (and I've read this seems to be a mostly US phenomena due to regulations which kept banks small and limited to one state (heck, when I arrived in Massachusetts in 1979 a bank couldn't cross county lines; my bank (BayBank) had a holding company on top of their individual county banks)).
The vast, near total majority of "bailouts", like the multiple efforts to prop up residential real estate prices in the US or Cash for Clunkers (which at best moved purchases forward in time and in the latter case amply demonstrate the Broken Window thesis) are not called for.
An edge case of possibly justified intervention might be keeping GM and Chrysler alive so that the failure of the suppliers wouldn't put Ford out of business; that would be another example of a cascading failure, but a hopefully limited one and obviously spending less money by only keeping Ford's supply line intact would have been a lot better.
(And, yeah, I've grown rather fond of "misapprehension"; it's great for situations where someone has gotten part of the point but the rest is succeeding for the moment in getting away.)
I agree that discovering the new price is not a calamity, my argument is narrowly limited to keeping the financial system going so that process can happen in a orderly fashion. The Great Depression in the US was immeasurably worse due to all the bank failures triggered by this sort of thing (and I've read this seems to be a mostly US phenomena due to regulations which kept banks small and limited to one state (heck, when I arrived in Massachusetts in 1979 a bank couldn't cross county lines; my bank (BayBank) had a holding company on top of their individual county banks)).
The vast, near total majority of "bailouts", like the multiple efforts to prop up residential real estate prices in the US or Cash for Clunkers (which at best moved purchases forward in time and in the latter case amply demonstrate the Broken Window thesis) are not called for.
An edge case of possibly justified intervention might be keeping GM and Chrysler alive so that the failure of the suppliers wouldn't put Ford out of business; that would be another example of a cascading failure, but a hopefully limited one and obviously spending less money by only keeping Ford's supply line intact would have been a lot better.
ADDED: Here's Andy Kessler in the WSJ on "TARP and the Continuing Problem of Toxic Assets", due to the bait and switch (I supported the bait...): http://www.google.com/search?q=%22but+no+one+could+decide+wh...
(And, yeah, I've grown rather fond of "misapprehension"; it's great for situations where someone has gotten part of the point but the rest is succeeding for the moment in getting away.)