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Re:Why Searching Through 500M Pwned Passwords Is So Quick by jgrahamc on Tuesday February 27, 2018 @11:23AM (#16474890)
I don't understand why everyone's obsessed with using a Bloom Filter for this. The median response size on the API is 12.2KB with 305 entries. A Bloom Filter with 305 entries and a 0.000001 false positive rate would be about 1KB. It seems to me you're introducing a lot of complexity (Bloom Filter vs. simple string match) and possibility of false positives to save 11KB.
Re:Why Searching Through 500M Pwned Passwords Is So Quick by ericfrederich on Tuesday February 27, 2018 @11:32AM (#16475013)
A bloom filter can be pushed to clients. Everything is static and could be served from a CDN. If there is a hit you could then do a secondary request to perform an actual lookup. For passwords which have not been pwned there'd be a 100% savings on CPU.
Re:Why Searching Through 500M Pwned Passwords Is So Quick by jgrahamc on Tuesday February 27, 2018 @12:16PM (#16475527)
True, although there's an interesting side effect. With the false positive rate tuned low any call to the actual API would likely be saying "My password is one of the ones you already know about" with quite high probability.
Re:Why Searching Through 500M Pwned Passwords Is So Quick by KMag on Tuesday February 27, 2018 @11:52AM (#16475266)
Presumably the use case is to reject either common or compromised passwords, and they'd like to eliminate a point of failure by not depending upon Troy's service being up / maintained forever.

Also, a Bloom filter has a smaller page cache footprint and disk space usage than using a precise set.