That's easy. And moreover, its a bigger threat. With a Huawei phone, the Chinese government has control over everything from the processor to the userspace software. With a small piece of silicon in a fab, the threat surface is much smaller; they'd have to sneak it in against Apple's will, past all of Apple's American-loyal QA.
In the software world, we tend to think about security as an absolute, because computer logic is absolute. In the real world, security is probabilities. How can you minimize the chance of breach while minimizing costs.
Is Apple's QA workforce mostly American or do they have a lot of Chinese H1Bs? I mean loyalty is a fickle thing.
If the 'threat' was real, that makes as much sense as hardening one door in your house, when you have 4 other doors because "you can't protect against every threat model".
Asking Apple to manufacturer their phones outside of the US is a highly expensive action.
That being said if you don’t control the software, modifying manually a handful of devices doesn’t scale. If you modify all of them the chance that you will be spotted is very high. If you control the software and it is encrypted / not readable, you can backdoor all devices of a whole country. So I can see how it is a step up in term of threat level.
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...
Exactly my thought. US gov't even outsources to private contractors that then subcontract and outsource to China for electronic components including chips that can easily end up in our DOD systems. I wonder if this is more of a money or market thing being pushed by the Existing Oligopoly?
Something doesn't appear to add up completely?