How do we know we've created something with consciousness, and not just a very sophisticated program? The philosophy you disparage already has a term for this: the "philosophical zombie". For all intents and purposes, they appear human, but they have no internal experience whatsoever. All you'll have done is shunt the problem downstream.
Also, you're wrong about early vision. That's the best studied part of the brain, and in fact, researchers have applied ML techniques to fMRI data and extracted out the images being shown.
-- How do we know other humans aren't "very sophisticated programs"? How do we care? Which is to say the whole "omg they look and act the same but are so, sooo different" of philosophical zombies talk and similar, uh, rot, is kind of leveraging the person's intuitive attachment the idea of a soul, a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object.
Also, you're wrong about early vision. That's the best studied part of the brain, and in fact, researchers have applied ML techniques to fMRI data and extracted out the images being shown.
If you read the GP in context, it doesn't say neurologists haven't studied consciousness, it says people have no self-awareness of the preprocessing that goes into creating vision.
We don't. Most people assume that other people have consciousness, with various justifications, but no one can know that.
>a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object.
But it does make a difference morally speaking. If we consider a Utilitarian model of morality, then what is good or bad is that which causes the experiences of happiness or suffering. But if a philosophical zombie does not experience pleasure or suffering, then there is no moral consequence to harming them, any more than there is moral consequence to watching someone die in a movie, or to splitting a rock in half.
And this becomes even more worrying when we start to think about AI. If an AI can develop consciousness as a result of our actions, then perhaps it can also experience suffering as a result of our actions.
Of course, since we cannot identify p-zombies, possibly by definition, one can argue that there's not much point thinking about it. But, well, you could say that about a lot of philosophy. Personally, I think it's valuable to think about these things as an intellectual exercise, even if we can't really conclude anything from it.
No, qualia/awareness is not magical, it's prima facie undeniable, we are aware of things, and we have an experience of the world. In fact, consciousness is more fundamental than everything else we know about the world, because all else we know is known by awareness. That scientific paper you read? You were aware of it. Bacteria under the microscope? You had an experience of seeing.
It's the very definition of the hard problem. How does biology lead to awareness? We have strong evidence they're related (sleep, scotomas, mental disease, drugs, etc etc etc), but we have yet to pinpoint the connection.
As for the philosophical zombie being "rot", consciousness neuroscientists have already debated if it were actually possible, and if so, detectable. We already know about a phenomenon called blindsight for vision, where you can perform visual tasks but have no experience of seeing; how do we know there's not some frontal lesion that could wipe out or reduces your awareness, but leave your other faculties mostly intact?
OK, "magic" is the adjective adjective added for flavor, "no measurable properties" is the key term. The most obvious point is the "philosophical zombie" which specifically posited to have no measurable differences from a non-Zombie.
It doesn't seem particularly strange that a "thinking being" would be receiving and processing data. Human language can used to reference internal experience that is assume to be common to all humans (as your construct above shows). But these references can't directly be to something "primal" since they're representations.
Essentially, this style of mysticism references internal experiences with individuals emotionally valuing their internal experiences and wanting them to be irreducible to just matter. And once the mystical concept goes out in the world, it wants to cloth itself in the appearance of science - first philosophical zombies are have no identity except "the same on the outside, identical on the inside" and then opportunists wanting to leverage this canard take out their microscopes and imagining measuring to regain some respectability. Yet, let us posit the unmeasurable and then try to measure it. I assume the church of the Giant Spaghetti Monster has a rite for doing just this.
So we'd be dealing with a situation where we have something that is behaving in a human like manner using mechanisms that are (to a first approximation) how humans do it.
Claiming that that program isn't conscious is close to defending the idea that the sun orbits the earth - the argument is 'even though we have accurate measurement everything and a well verified model, the implications are discomforting; hence the model must be wrong'.
There are people who won't handle the idea that consciousness is rooted in physical processes that we already have a handle on.
But what you're really asking is, would we experience mirth or humor if stimulated. And we know that's true, at least for memories. Certain hippocampal stimulations elicit associated memories.
The problem is not whether biology is related to consciousness (it is), but how?
Our ability to talk about consciousness doesn’t prove much either, because it turns out we can’t explain the idea in words. Trying to explain consciousness comes down to statements like: it’s the difference between seeing and !!!seeing!!! We can only communicate its true nature by way of alluding to the other’s experience of the same, not by direct explanation.
I don’t think it’s helpful to being morality into it. Depending on your moral views, there might be good reason to treat things that we think are conscious as if they are conscious. That’s arguably what we do with other people. It doesn’t speak to the underlying questions though.
While I’m suggesting above that conscious experience itself is probably irreducible and uncommunicable, that doesn’t mean that we can’t understand its causes and effects. It seems highly plausible that consciousness plays some functional role in the human brain, the understanding of which could be useful for medicine and AI.
Finally, I find plenty of utility in the joy and wonder of trying to understand this universe. The existence of consciousness as one kind of phenomenon or another has profound implications for our understanding of it, disproving some hypotheses and suggesting new ones.
Is illusion real because we experience it?
It seems highly plausible that consciousness plays some functional role in the human brain, the understanding of which could be useful for medicine and AI.
Evolution produces things which aren't "useful" all the time. Examples: That dimple above your upper lip. The blind spot. The human coccyx...
The existence of consciousness as one kind of phenomenon or another has profound implications for our understanding of it, disproving some hypotheses and suggesting new ones.
[citation needed]
Consciousness is the experiencing.
If one deeply introspects about the nature of one's experience of experience, one may come to realize there's a certain fragmentary nature to consciousness.
Have you ever had episodes of behavior, for which you have no memory? "Blackouts?" I have. What if consciousness is simply an interesting epiphenomenon, unnecessary for thought and decision making? If all we have are people's reports of it, why should we accord any more epistemological significance to it than we do to religious experiences?
As for the illusion question, it’s missing the point.
It doesn’t make sense to call it an illusion. Your conscious experience may accurately reflect reality, but that doesn’t change the fact that you are experiencing the phenomenon of consciousness. That our consciousness is more fragmented than we at first think is similarly irrelevant to the hard problem; fragmented or not, the subjective experience lacks explanation.
It’s very well possible that consciousness is unnecessary for thought. I strongly doubt that it is totally useless altogether, but that’s certainly possible too.
Even if you believe it is probably useless, we investigate things of dubious utility all the time, often discovering unforeseen uses along the way.
So the question remains: why are you so eager to dismiss the defining feature of the human experience?
Am I? If consciousness were a phenomenon no one had a memory of, would we even know it to exist? We certainly wouldn't be having this discussion. I can imagine a consciousness without memory, but I can also imagine a fantasy unicorn in real life. This doesn't mean either exists.
As for the illusion question, it’s missing the point. P
I don't think so. I think it's very significant that there's little difference between the consciousness of real sensory information and consciousness of illusion.
Even if you believe it is probably useless, we investigate things of dubious utility all the time, often discovering unforeseen uses along the way.
So you have no proof for your assertion. Only a suspicion. Perhaps a well founded one, I could even grant that.
Absolutely. We have awareness in the current moment. Memory is not required. In fact, if you think about what memory is, it's a current, internal experience that we associate with a concept called the past. All memories are actually experienced in the present, making awareness more fundamental than memory.
Without memory, the contents of awareness would be very different, sure, but it's not a prerequisite for awareness itself.
Since when? (Not just a joke. Also a serious question.)
In fact, if you think about what memory is, it's a current, internal experience that we associate with a concept called the past.
Uh, no. I can remember what I had for dinner last night without having a flashback where I re-experience last night as in some kind of dream.
Without memory, the contents of awareness would be very different, sure, but it's not a prerequisite for awareness itself.
How do you know? There are people who can't move short term memories into long term storage, but they can remember enough to be able to play Tic-Tac-Toe, for example.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anterograde_amnesia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_memory
Do we have any verifiable examples of consciousness where there is absolutely no memory? I very much doubt it.
Just because a memory is not as vivid as sight or a dream, doesn't mean it's not currently in consciousness. Think about it, when you're remembering, you're aware of something: the memory. It could be a fact you're aware of, or a diminished sensory experience playing in the mind's eye, but you're still aware of it.
> How do you know? There are people who can't move short term memories into long term storage, but they can remember enough to be able to play Tic-Tac-Toe, for example.
That example is about memory and behavior, not awareness. A complete anterograde and retrograde amnesic would still have an experience of seeing (some odd shapes) and emotion (being confused, stressed, etc). And in fact, this is what we think the consciousness of pre-long-term-memory infants is. To quote William James: "blooming, buzzing confusion".
> Do we have any verifiable examples of consciousness where there is absolutely no memory? I very much doubt it.
That's true only because 99.99999999999999% of humans have no memory deficits. It's correlated but there's no causal relationship needed. The only thing an amnesic can't be aware of is a memory they can't access or that was never formed.
Humans don't really have that much "reflection", in the sense that we use the term in programming. We can't see our library of reflexes. We can't see what early vision is doing. We can't look at the rationale behind our own classifiers. We can't look at how our memory is indexed. Trying to understand the mind by introspection is thus inherently futile.