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Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by Animats on Monday February 12, 2018 @06:56PM (#16363538)
We're not far enough along in AI to address this yet and get anywhere. Philosophy will not help. Introspection and writing about "consciousness" goes back over 2000 years and hasn't produced all that much.

Humans don't really have that much "reflection", in the sense that we use the term in programming. We can't see our library of reflexes. We can't see what early vision is doing. We can't look at the rationale behind our own classifiers. We can't look at how our memory is indexed. Trying to understand the mind by introspection is thus inherently futile.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by KingMob on Monday February 12, 2018 @08:19PM (#16363982)
...say we build/grow an AI system that passes the Turing test. We talk to it, it comes across as plausibly human.

How do we know we've created something with consciousness, and not just a very sophisticated program? The philosophy you disparage already has a term for this: the "philosophical zombie". For all intents and purposes, they appear human, but they have no internal experience whatsoever. All you'll have done is shunt the problem downstream.

Also, you're wrong about early vision. That's the best studied part of the brain, and in fact, researchers have applied ML techniques to fMRI data and extracted out the images being shown.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by joe_the_user on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:31PM (#16364772)
How do we know we've created something with consciousness, and not just a very sophisticated program?

-- How do we know other humans aren't "very sophisticated programs"? How do we care? Which is to say the whole "omg they look and act the same but are so, sooo different" of philosophical zombies talk and similar, uh, rot, is kind of leveraging the person's intuitive attachment the idea of a soul, a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object.

Also, you're wrong about early vision. That's the best studied part of the brain, and in fact, researchers have applied ML techniques to fMRI data and extracted out the images being shown.

If you read the GP in context, it doesn't say neurologists haven't studied consciousness, it says people have no self-awareness of the preprocessing that goes into creating vision.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by aninhumer on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @06:21AM (#16366313)
>How do we know other humans aren't "very sophisticated programs"?

We don't. Most people assume that other people have consciousness, with various justifications, but no one can know that.

>a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object.

But it does make a difference morally speaking. If we consider a Utilitarian model of morality, then what is good or bad is that which causes the experiences of happiness or suffering. But if a philosophical zombie does not experience pleasure or suffering, then there is no moral consequence to harming them, any more than there is moral consequence to watching someone die in a movie, or to splitting a rock in half.

And this becomes even more worrying when we start to think about AI. If an AI can develop consciousness as a result of our actions, then perhaps it can also experience suffering as a result of our actions.

Of course, since we cannot identify p-zombies, possibly by definition, one can argue that there's not much point thinking about it. But, well, you could say that about a lot of philosophy. Personally, I think it's valuable to think about these things as an intellectual exercise, even if we can't really conclude anything from it.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by KingMob on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @01:29PM (#16369468)
> a magic thing with no measurable properties that makes us oh-so-different than a crude material object

No, qualia/awareness is not magical, it's prima facie undeniable, we are aware of things, and we have an experience of the world. In fact, consciousness is more fundamental than everything else we know about the world, because all else we know is known by awareness. That scientific paper you read? You were aware of it. Bacteria under the microscope? You had an experience of seeing.

It's the very definition of the hard problem. How does biology lead to awareness? We have strong evidence they're related (sleep, scotomas, mental disease, drugs, etc etc etc), but we have yet to pinpoint the connection.

As for the philosophical zombie being "rot", consciousness neuroscientists have already debated if it were actually possible, and if so, detectable. We already know about a phenomenon called blindsight for vision, where you can perform visual tasks but have no experience of seeing; how do we know there's not some frontal lesion that could wipe out or reduces your awareness, but leave your other faculties mostly intact?

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by joe_the_user on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @02:51PM (#16370133)
No, qualia/awareness is not magical, it's prima facie undeniable, we are aware of things, and we have an experience of the world.

OK, "magic" is the adjective adjective added for flavor, "no measurable properties" is the key term. The most obvious point is the "philosophical zombie" which specifically posited to have no measurable differences from a non-Zombie.

It doesn't seem particularly strange that a "thinking being" would be receiving and processing data. Human language can used to reference internal experience that is assume to be common to all humans (as your construct above shows). But these references can't directly be to something "primal" since they're representations.

Essentially, this style of mysticism references internal experiences with individuals emotionally valuing their internal experiences and wanting them to be irreducible to just matter. And once the mystical concept goes out in the world, it wants to cloth itself in the appearance of science - first philosophical zombies are have no identity except "the same on the outside, identical on the inside" and then opportunists wanting to leverage this canard take out their microscopes and imagining measuring to regain some respectability. Yet, let us posit the unmeasurable and then try to measure it. I assume the church of the Giant Spaghetti Monster has a rite for doing just this.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by UnquietTinkerer on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:01PM (#16364403)
If we can't quantify "internal experience" then what leads philosophers to believe it exists? What evidence is there that conciousness is distinguished by something other than raw complexity?
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by CuriouslyC on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:28PM (#16364754)
Given the fact that the only reason you are aware of the world around you is through internal experience (i.e. consciousness), the reverse question is actually more salient: how can you prove that the "real world" really exists? How do you know that it isn't entirely imagined?
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by roenxi on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:41PM (#16364558)
Adding a few sentences to this point; the mechanism for this "AI system that passes the Turing test" likely to involve neural networks.

So we'd be dealing with a situation where we have something that is behaving in a human like manner using mechanisms that are (to a first approximation) how humans do it.

Claiming that that program isn't conscious is close to defending the idea that the sun orbits the earth - the argument is 'even though we have accurate measurement everything and a well verified model, the implications are discomforting; hence the model must be wrong'.

There are people who won't handle the idea that consciousness is rooted in physical processes that we already have a handle on.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:43PM (#16364570)
Consciousness as it’s being discussed is not intelligence or even the ability to reason about one’s own existence. Is both less and more than those things, really just different altogether. It is subjective experience itself, the inner world somehow projected for you by your mind. It is the experience of seeing and hearing, the feeling of an emotion.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by state_less on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:32PM (#16364774)
This subjective experience is subject to causation. If a doctor stimulates a certain area of the brain, laughter, smiles or cries might occur. If an anesthetic is taken, this could cause consciousness to cease for some time. So we have this connection between the external world and the subjective. I'm curious though, if you stimulated the laughing part of the brain when someone is anesthetized, would they still laugh, even if they aren't conscious? Is consciousness necessary for certain acts?
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by KingMob on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @01:32PM (#16369498)
Well, laughing is behavior, and I'm sure there are secondary motor cortices that could force that when stimulated.

But what you're really asking is, would we experience mirth or humor if stimulated. And we know that's true, at least for memories. Certain hippocampal stimulations elicit associated memories.

The problem is not whether biology is related to consciousness (it is), but how?

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by state_less on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @06:10PM (#16371771)
If the explanation for how it works is something along the lines of, a electrochemical wave passing through a network under x conditions. Will people be okay with it? If you have the whole thing on video, so to speak, where you can see the whole mirthful experience unfold, and can recreate it elsewhere, will that be enough? I guess I'm asking what the standard is for explaining how consciousness arises?
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by stcredzero on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:55PM (#16364619)
If we made a machine with the capacity for simulating intelligence, the ability to reason about one's own existence, and furthermore, gave it the ability to simulate a belief in its experience of seeing and hearing and feeling emotion and a survival instinct, would it be ethical to destroy such a machine? At that point, wouldn't it protest its own sentience, consciousness, and desire to live as convincingly as a human?
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:01PM (#16364641)
That’s really a separate question. We really can’t be sure that other people are conscious at all either. Consciousness may have behavioral consequences, but it’s not clear that it is necessary for those behaviors. Perhaps those behaviors can come about some other way.

Our ability to talk about consciousness doesn’t prove much either, because it turns out we can’t explain the idea in words. Trying to explain consciousness comes down to statements like: it’s the difference between seeing and !!!seeing!!! We can only communicate its true nature by way of alluding to the other’s experience of the same, not by direct explanation.

I don’t think it’s helpful to being morality into it. Depending on your moral views, there might be good reason to treat things that we think are conscious as if they are conscious. That’s arguably what we do with other people. It doesn’t speak to the underlying questions though.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by c22 on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:53PM (#16364854)
If, as you surmise, we're discussing a concept which cannot be articulated and which has no moral consequence then what underlying questions remain and what use should we find in answering them? It strikes me as similar to logical paradoxes--a fuzzy ambiguity more likely reflective of limitations in our languages and our particular models of reasoning than of any underlying physical truth.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @08:16AM (#16366860)
Consciousness is real because we experience it. If anything, the existence of our own subjective experience is the only thing we can be sure of. Usefulness has no bearing on it.

While I’m suggesting above that conscious experience itself is probably irreducible and uncommunicable, that doesn’t mean that we can’t understand its causes and effects. It seems highly plausible that consciousness plays some functional role in the human brain, the understanding of which could be useful for medicine and AI.

Finally, I find plenty of utility in the joy and wonder of trying to understand this universe. The existence of consciousness as one kind of phenomenon or another has profound implications for our understanding of it, disproving some hypotheses and suggesting new ones.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by stcredzero on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @01:35PM (#16369525)
Consciousness is real because we experience it.

Is illusion real because we experience it?

It seems highly plausible that consciousness plays some functional role in the human brain, the understanding of which could be useful for medicine and AI.

Evolution produces things which aren't "useful" all the time. Examples: That dimple above your upper lip. The blind spot. The human coccyx...

The existence of consciousness as one kind of phenomenon or another has profound implications for our understanding of it, disproving some hypotheses and suggesting new ones.

[citation needed]

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @02:24PM (#16369906)
>Is illusion real because we experience it?

Consciousness is the experiencing.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by stcredzero on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @03:16PM (#16370335)
You didn't answer the question. So the consciousness of the illusion is real? One of my girlfriends was a voracious reader, but couldn't for the life of her recall anything out of them. She used to joke that I was "functionally illiterate" because I'd take six months to read something like Kavalier and Klay, but I could remember certain scenes in great detail. Is my ex-girlfriends' experience of her reading books real? Reading gives her great pleasure, so she must experience such pleasure. Her experience seems to be like mine when I recall having a dream where I felt certain emotions, but the contents of the dream fade out of my memory. Is her experience of reading and my experience of dreaming real?

If one deeply introspects about the nature of one's experience of experience, one may come to realize there's a certain fragmentary nature to consciousness.

Have you ever had episodes of behavior, for which you have no memory? "Blackouts?" I have. What if consciousness is simply an interesting epiphenomenon, unnecessary for thought and decision making? If all we have are people's reports of it, why should we accord any more epistemological significance to it than we do to religious experiences?

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @04:01PM (#16370734)
You’re conflating memory with consciousness.

As for the illusion question, it’s missing the point.

It doesn’t make sense to call it an illusion. Your conscious experience may accurately reflect reality, but that doesn’t change the fact that you are experiencing the phenomenon of consciousness. That our consciousness is more fragmented than we at first think is similarly irrelevant to the hard problem; fragmented or not, the subjective experience lacks explanation.

It’s very well possible that consciousness is unnecessary for thought. I strongly doubt that it is totally useless altogether, but that’s certainly possible too.

Even if you believe it is probably useless, we investigate things of dubious utility all the time, often discovering unforeseen uses along the way.

So the question remains: why are you so eager to dismiss the defining feature of the human experience?

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by stcredzero on Tuesday February 13, 2018 @04:31PM (#16370971)
You’re conflating memory with consciousness.

Am I? If consciousness were a phenomenon no one had a memory of, would we even know it to exist? We certainly wouldn't be having this discussion. I can imagine a consciousness without memory, but I can also imagine a fantasy unicorn in real life. This doesn't mean either exists.

As for the illusion question, it’s missing the point. P

I don't think so. I think it's very significant that there's little difference between the consciousness of real sensory information and consciousness of illusion.

Even if you believe it is probably useless, we investigate things of dubious utility all the time, often discovering unforeseen uses along the way.

So you have no proof for your assertion. Only a suspicion. Perhaps a well founded one, I could even grant that.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by KingMob on Wednesday February 14, 2018 @02:43PM (#16378715)
If consciousness were a phenomenon no one had a memory of, would we even know it to exist?

Absolutely. We have awareness in the current moment. Memory is not required. In fact, if you think about what memory is, it's a current, internal experience that we associate with a concept called the past. All memories are actually experienced in the present, making awareness more fundamental than memory.

Without memory, the contents of awareness would be very different, sure, but it's not a prerequisite for awareness itself.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by stcredzero on Wednesday February 14, 2018 @06:33PM (#16380603)
Memory is not required.

Since when? (Not just a joke. Also a serious question.)

In fact, if you think about what memory is, it's a current, internal experience that we associate with a concept called the past.

Uh, no. I can remember what I had for dinner last night without having a flashback where I re-experience last night as in some kind of dream.

Without memory, the contents of awareness would be very different, sure, but it's not a prerequisite for awareness itself.

How do you know? There are people who can't move short term memories into long term storage, but they can remember enough to be able to play Tic-Tac-Toe, for example.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anterograde_amnesia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_memory

Do we have any verifiable examples of consciousness where there is absolutely no memory? I very much doubt it.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by KingMob on Tuesday February 27, 2018 @01:16PM (#16476248)
> Uh, no. I can remember what I had for dinner last night without having a flashback where I re-experience last night as in some kind of dream.

Just because a memory is not as vivid as sight or a dream, doesn't mean it's not currently in consciousness. Think about it, when you're remembering, you're aware of something: the memory. It could be a fact you're aware of, or a diminished sensory experience playing in the mind's eye, but you're still aware of it.

> How do you know? There are people who can't move short term memories into long term storage, but they can remember enough to be able to play Tic-Tac-Toe, for example.

That example is about memory and behavior, not awareness. A complete anterograde and retrograde amnesic would still have an experience of seeing (some odd shapes) and emotion (being confused, stressed, etc). And in fact, this is what we think the consciousness of pre-long-term-memory infants is. To quote William James: "blooming, buzzing confusion".

> Do we have any verifiable examples of consciousness where there is absolutely no memory? I very much doubt it.

That's true only because 99.99999999999999% of humans have no memory deficits. It's correlated but there's no causal relationship needed. The only thing an amnesic can't be aware of is a memory they can't access or that was never formed.

Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by discoursism on Monday February 12, 2018 @11:21PM (#16364731)
It will not be provable, the same way you cannot prove your consciousness to me. All the philosophizing in the world will never change that fact. The most we'll know is that the artificial intelligence appears to be conscious, and shows the same or similar physical appearance of consciousness that we ourselves do.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by wildmusings on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:41PM (#16364563)
What leads them to think it exists? Having the internal experience themselves of course.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by mannykannot on Monday February 12, 2018 @10:00PM (#16364401)
The jury is still out on whether the concept of p-zombies contributes to the understanding of consciousness, or is a misleading dead-end.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by cgmg on Monday February 12, 2018 @07:27PM (#16363712)
Introspection allows one to develop plausible axioms, conditions, or properties that are satisfied by a conscious object (e.g. ourselves) and move on from there, as Giulio Tononi did with Integrated Information Theory.
Re:The Meta-Problem of Consciousness [pdf] by foxhill on Monday February 12, 2018 @07:18PM (#16363664)
to further your analogy to programming to refute that, humans have had significant advances in the inner workings of the brain (re some of the topics you’ve mentioned) from its dissassembly.. albeit with little, if any, improvement in our understanding on the nature or origin of consciousness..