But (given the idea that we're talking about future chips) it could help describe protection boundaries in a finer grain way to protect against Spectre in the same way that AMD is protected against Meltdown.
The main issue with spectre (in a long term sense) is that the CPU really has no way of understanding that you're running lower privileged code in a higher context, whether that be BPF in the kernel, or JS in the browser. IMO, we're going to be fighting the same battle over and over again as the all of the mitigations so far are heavily microarchitecure specific.
But in the context of trends, we're moving towards User^Kernel memory mapping with features SMAP. That idea combined with kernel changes to holistically enforce separation boundaries more effectively along with cache partitioning AFAICT leads to potential end game win on this front.
Edit: And to be totally up front my major side project is adding a BPF/seccomp esque virtual machine into a formally verified kernel, so my head is in that space.