It's all either ring 3 (user) or ring 0 (kernel) for the purposes of this discussion. The biggest architectural impediment is the single bit for ring selection in page table entries. And since long mode requires paging, there's currently not a way to select rings 1 and 2.
Although you might be able to play with some of the hypervisor extensions to give you guest ring 0 context inside a regular user process... See Akaros for a good example of what that looks like.
> Which brings me to another something I don't understand about this. If mispredictions leave their calculations in cache why can't that cached data be cleared after the branch is determined to be bad?
Because the cache is a fixed size, and that just kicks the can down the road. You'll just test for the eviction in your exploit instead.
"Clearing the cached data" is just as detectable as caching the data in the first place. You'd have to treat the line fill as a transaction that could be rolled back. Unfortunately, transactional memory and CPU caches lie at polar-opposite ends of the performance spectrum.
IMHO the only safe way to do a fetch from prohibited memory is to not do it at all.
You can also observe changes to the TLB state, though - so you'd have to do the same buffering-and-commit dance there as well.
Maybe you can also leak data through the BTB or RTB (double-Spectre!), or by tieing up particular execution units conditionally which is observable by a sibling hyperthread?
Which brings me to another something I don't understand about this. If mispredictions leave their calculations in cache why can't that cached data be cleared after the branch is determined to be bad?