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Re:Discontinue support for weak cryptographic standards by hannob on Wednesday January 31, 2018 @08:12PM (#16279000)
> Why still support the TLS_RSA_* ciphers, given that they, unlike TLS 1.1, have a known vulnerability?

TLS 1.1 also has known by design vulnerabilities. It only supports two cipher modes, RC4 and CBC/HMAC. The first is vulnerable to biases, the second to padding oracles + Lucky 13.

Yeah, padding oracles can be avoided by implementing crazy, complicated countermeasures. Same is true for TLS_RSA. (Though I do agree that TLS_RSA is probably more problematic.)

Re:Discontinue support for weak cryptographic standards by Area12 on Thursday February 01, 2018 @02:54AM (#16280267)
So ... why do they continue with tls_rsa? Is it required because of middleboxes lagging behind?