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Re:Redox OS Crash Challenge by rkeene2 on Monday January 22, 2018 @12:56PM (#16206366)
I agree that it isn't Java-specific, but Java is affected despite being memory safe and "it's pretty hard to provide malicious input to non-malicious Java source code that takes control over the interpreter" may not be as true a statement as it appears.
Re:Redox OS Crash Challenge by geofft on Monday January 22, 2018 @01:37PM (#16206698)
That's a fair objection, and I already had to add a caveat about deserialization libraries that can instantiate arbitrary objects. (Which is a problem that affects other memory-safe dynamically-typed languages too, e.g., Python's pickle and yaml modules have the same problems.)

I think there is a meaningful distinction, still, between something like OGNL where the program / library is providing its own interpreter of the EDSL that is excessively capable (which can be done in any language, including Turing-incomplete languages, capability systems, etc.: a library can always dispatch input to whatever functions are available to it) -- i.e., where the programmer intended the functionality that was implemented, they just didn't think through what they were doing -- and things like buffer overflows and ROP where the course of program execution, on the existing interpreter / runtime / platform, is subverted to something the programmer did not intend. I'm not quite sure how to phrase it. (And I'm not sure on which side of the line arbitrary-object deserialization lands.)

Re:Redox OS Crash Challenge by rkeene2 on Monday January 22, 2018 @02:01PM (#16206924)
I'd phrase it as "Programmers can write vulnerabilities in any language" :-)