It's as if we lived in a world where bridges have been built for decades with structural engineers as optional, rather than required by building code. If your project had a budget for a structural engineer, you hired one, but if not, fine, you just had your construction contractor do their best.
And so now a bridge just collapsed again (fortunately everyone got off in time) and we're talking about how we really ought to design bridges better, but no one is suggesting the obvious, that we legislate building codes that require structural engineers as part of the bridge-building process.
I know this is a controversial idea, as it opens up the question of UX design certification and licensure (if you require UX for critical infrastructure, what are the qualifications?), which can lead to all sorts of unintended consequences of gatekeeping, exclusion, and administrative bloat. But I think Hawaii makes it clear that the status quo is unsafe and unsustainable.
Or even a "code" like the National Electrical Code, which one would be required to comply with when working on critical infrastructure. That's how electricians apply the safety experience gained from previous unsafe practices.
It's similar to the "A gun is always loaded" principle. Unless you can tell at a glance that a firearm is not in a ready-to-fire state, you treat it as if it is. People are clumsy and forgetful, and you only have to mess up once.
Leaving the live rounds right next to the blanks, in that way, is pretty indefensible. (Ignoring of course that blanks can still kill, for this analogy.)
That's when you need to treat it like it is the most.
Chance you are actually able to say that vs. chance you made a mistake in reasoning that conclusion? Still not a bet worth taking.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blank_(cartridge)#/media/File:...
The first bullet here is a blank.
Yes, the correct term is indeed 'cartridge'.
I totally agree that the solution should leverage obviation to prevent human error in an emergency, that's what a drill is all about.
Sending an emergency alert isn't an action that requires split-second muscle memory. I think slight deviations in the drill vs. the real thing are fine in this case, in order to prevent false alarms.
There's no one-size-fits-all solution here, you have to analyze the trade-offs around speed and the cost of a false alarm.
That's because they forgot the lesson decades ago. It seems like the 1971 event is a forgotten piece of cold war history. I haven't seen any mention of it in the couple of news articles I read.
> it's interesting that there is a lot of hang up on false negative (false alarm) and very little discussion about a false positive (hitting the test button instead of the real alarm)
We haven't ever had a nuclear missile attack, and even if we had one, there's very little anyone could actually do to protect themselves. The alert seems more of a courtesy than a real actionable warning. The fear and panic of a false alarm are real, though. Also, if there are too many false alarms, they turn into crying wolf and will be ignored.
The fix was to:
> …In the past three tapes, one for the test and two for actual emergencies, were hanging on three labeled hooks above the transmitter… In the future only the test tape will be left near the transmitter. The two emergency tapes [will be] be sealed in clearly marked envelopes and placed inside a nearby cabinet.
http://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/09/code-word-hatefulness-g...