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Re:Meltdown Proof-of-Concept by ckastner on Wednesday January 10, 2018 @03:36AM (#16113373)
This paper from 2005 describes a cache timing attack that enabled an unprivileged process to another process' AES key:

https://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/papers/cache.pdf

IIRC, the only way to address the issue was the addition of the AES-NI instruction set, which came a few years later.

Re:Meltdown Proof-of-Concept by cesarb on Wednesday January 10, 2018 @07:41AM (#16114501)
> IIRC, the only way to address the issue was the addition of the AES-NI instruction set, which came a few years later.

Another option would be to use a bitsliced implementation of AES, at some cost in speed. I could also imagine an implementation which read the whole table every time, using constant-time operations to select the desired element(s), but I don't know how slow that would be.