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Re:Tcpcrypt by sesqu on Monday August 16, 2010 @11:20PM (#1610137)
there is no difference to the browser between a TLS connection bearing a self-signed cert and a TLS connection that was supposed to bear a CA-signed cert but isn't.

As long as my browser can tell the difference between a Citibank with a CA-signed cert and a Citibank without one, why should I care about the exact manner in which the wrong Citibank doesn't have what it should? What makes encryption without authentication so much more dangerous than plaintext?

Edit: You talk about forged certificates a lot. Do you mean that browsers acts as if certificates are for a secret club only, and anyone not a member (CA) but using the technology is infringing? I could believe that, as it jives with how I initially understood the business model. The problem, then, is that non-members like to authenticate too, and it is assumed they will do so via other channels and that their users are technologically sophisticated enough to import the certificates - when the key continuity thing is actually more popular.

Since the browsers check your credentials anyway, I see no point in getting paranoid about seeing an unfamiliar signature. That's only a deception if your guards consider the mere existence of a signature as proof of authorization - that is, if they're human. If they always check, there is no point in bluffing, and so an unrecognized signature should not be considered treachery.

Re:Tcpcrypt by tptacek on Tuesday August 17, 2010 @12:28AM (#1610267)
I'm kind of confused by your questions, but: to be valid, a certificate needs to be signed by a CA for whom your browser holds a root CA certificate.

Without authentication, anybody who controls routing, ARP, or the DNS can break your encryption; they just stick themselves in the middle.

Re:Tcpcrypt by sesqu on Wednesday August 18, 2010 @03:41AM (#1613498)
The original question wasn't "why is encryption without authentication a bad idea"; it was "why is it worse than nothing". The only thing I can come up with is that some users look for https instead of the newer security banners.

The additional question was "is a non-CA-signed certificate irrelevant to authentication, or is it a forgery" - my opinion would be the former, browsers seem to think the latter.

It is my understanding that adding trusted third parties is possible for the client, but considered to be only for advanced users, and that adding security exceptions for self-signed certificates is unexpectedly common. I further consider the terminology unfortunate (servers with valid certificates are not certified, they are authenticated).