However neither that nor TLS "work out of the box: require no configuration, [and] no changes to applications".
Can you say that for tcpcrypt? Of course not.
I don't know what your second sentence even means. I didn't do anything to configure TLS. What did you have to do?
Not everything uses HTTP, a bunch of things like Torrent, IRC etc. use unencrypted protocols by default, and you have to explicitly add support to each one for encryption. Either by adding SSL support to the programs themselves, or by setting up a tunnel.
That's not the same as using opportunistic encryption that can happen at the kernel level. You could also do that with SSL to achieve the same aims, but the point is that it's opportunistic and happens without further userspace configuration.
So it ends up being opportunistic encryption, that's enabled when you don't need it and disabled when you do. It's just a security blanket.
Even when you can do an active attack it's not trivial in practice. The user my get suspicious if they've previously been able to initiate a tcpcrypt connection but can't do so now, and if you do this on a big scale (e.g. government sanctioned sniffing at an ISP) you'll probably be found out.
so they're risking their data on an uncertain possibility that a user might catch on that i've been downgrading their sessions and stealing everything? once you explain this to a user, do you think they'll really trust it?
If you and a friend set it up, tcpcrypt protects you from people who don't know to MITM TCP connections.