Why is it hopeless to do the same for email? Take a sane protocol subset, add a convention protocol for encryption, and ship it as "secure email"?
It is a tautology that a "secure mail app" that allows "traditional email interop" cannot make strong privacy guarantees, just like when using WhatsApp you give up federation and networking-as-a-utility (you're completely beholden to a provider that you don't even have a proper contract with, let alone the opportunity to seamlessly move providers / self-host / federate while maintaining global addressing and data portability).
I think that's part of the disconnect in the discussion - wrapping a sane protocol selection in an opaque app along with a saas/paas silo that limits addressing, routing and federation is OK for some arbitrary subset of not-by-themselves secure protocols, but any suggestion that reusing elements of email is dismissed as "can't be done" (or "can't be done, because webmail", while "can't be done because messenger.com" seems absent).
We've already done meta-data wrapping for email, with one, perhaps flawed approach:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixmaster_anonymous_remailer
Ed: i suppose the question.becomes if new systems rely on tls to help obscure meta-data or not; like what mail+gpg does.
I don't know why we'd bother with fussy contraptions involving special email addresses that nobody knows about, let alone uses. We have secure messaging systems today, systems billions of people already use, they're designed from the ground up to handle these problems, and so they're much better at security than any email system we can even reasonably come up with might be.
Why are we wasting time trying to make people feel safer emailing secrets? We should get them to stop doing that at all.