Opportunistic encryption (or any kind of negotiable security) is prone to downgrades by a MITM. Either both sides require strong security, or you must assume lowest common denominator.
While I have your attention, please do yourself a favor and pin some strong, modern ciphers for your SSH client: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Guidelines/OpenSSH#Modern
It's clear to me why "don't bother encrypting email" upsets nerds on message boards. But if you're going to trade getting the maximum number of messages safely encrypted for a deeply uncertain future in which most email is somehow reliably encrypted, you have priorities other than end-user safety --- and, I would argue (but do accept that I can't do so conclusively) priorities other than security engineering.
Anyway, even if email security cannot be perfect, I agree with the sentiment behind RFC 7435[2] - some protection is better than nothing.
If anything, I feel that they didn't go far enough in this compromise. Most people interact with their email through the provider's webmail client. Autocrypt is fundamentally incompatible with this[3]. This means that it will really not be useful for the majority of users.
1: https://signal.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/
2: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7435.html
3: https://autocrypt.org/level1.html#requirements-on-mua-e-mail...