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Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by dsacco on Sunday January 07, 2018 @12:06AM (#16089305)
> Oh look, another "middlebrow dismissal" (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4693920) upvoted to the top of a HN post. Color me surprised.

Do you see the irony in using a low-effort, middlebrow dismissal to call another comment a middlebrow dismissal? Re-read the comment you cited in your criticism, I think you may have taken the wrong lesson from it.

Unlike pg's comment, yours does not advance a substantive criticism or draw a novel insight into the conversation, which means it's also the same type of dismissal he was talking about.

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by losvedir on Sunday January 07, 2018 @12:08AM (#16089316)
Using the terminology of your link, tptacek is not "slightly more than unsophisticated" wrt security.

Dismissive, sure, but "middlebrow" it is not. I like that term, and I don't want it to turn into a generic, meaningless slap like "fascist" or something.

And it's worth taking seriously any comment about security on HN when we're lucky enough to get one by an expert, whether it's tptacek, moxie, cperciva, the professor who goes by his initials (whose name escapes me atm), and probably others.

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by Fnoord on Sunday January 07, 2018 @07:25AM (#16090608)
> the professor who goes by his initials

djb?

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by Cyph0n on Saturday January 06, 2018 @10:05PM (#16088876)
Not only that, but there is obvious bias whenever a popular HN user decides to chime in. I would wager that many people upvoted the comment without reading it... It's akin to voting ring behavior imo.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by brongondwana on Saturday January 06, 2018 @09:53PM (#16088829)
It's not a "middlebrow dismissal", it's a well reasoned argument about why this whole area of work is doomed to failure for structural reasons which can't be solved.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by antris on Saturday January 06, 2018 @11:43PM (#16089214)
The thing is, there's different degrees of failure. You can make email much more secure than it already is for a massive amount of users without sacrificing user experience. Just because it's not possible to make email the most perfectly secure messaging system invented by man doesn't mean we shouldn't make it more secure.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by brongondwana on Sunday January 07, 2018 @12:32AM (#16089408)
[CITATION NEEDED] as they say. Email providers are doing things like that - TLS encryption between systems is a legit improvement with no significant downsides. And there's work on improving that:

https://tools.ietf.org/wg/uta/

(SMTP-STS, SMTP-REQUIRETLS, etc)

And nobody's objecting to that. People are objecting to the idea of changing email to be a dumb blob payload transport for encrypted blobs, because:

(a) you can't do perfect forward security with email because of store and forward

(b) there are plenty of better protocols for immediate blob delivery, where PFS is possible - like Signal. So for pure encrypted transfer, Signal is a better choice than email.

(c) confidentiality absolutism is not the best security tradeoff for most users. The vast majority people likely to forget their password and need to get into their email at some point.

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by tptacek on Sunday January 07, 2018 @01:12AM (#16089547)
To be clear: store and forward doesn't keep you from doing forward secrecy; it just means that the existing SMTP security infrastructure can't provide end-to-end guarantees. You could come up with some sort of ratcheting protocol for email messages. I don't think you could easily/effectively do X3DH+Sesame with it, though.