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Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by tptacek on Saturday January 06, 2018 @08:37PM (#16088576)
Signal Protocol is designed for asynchronous messaging.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by lvs on Saturday January 06, 2018 @08:41PM (#16088592)
OK, so implement a Double-Ratchet protocol for email clients and call it a day. Don't say that no engineering is possible on this problem, as if that isn't a farcical statement.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by tptacek on Saturday January 06, 2018 @09:02PM (#16088649)
Have you considered that there might be a reason why none of the proposed schemes to retrofit encryption onto email involve double-ratchet protocols, even though all sorts of people come up with new messaging apps that do use double-ratchets? I think it's because it's very painful to accomplish ratchets in store-and-forward email, where the message update frequency is often measured in minutes, not milliseconds.

At any rate: suppose you actually accomplished that. You've still addressed only one of the bullets in my list above. Why bother? If you can get people to adopt new software, get them to adopt Signal, WhatsApp, or Wire.

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by lvs on Saturday January 06, 2018 @09:14PM (#16088691)
An individual server-to-server communication occurs in milliseconds, so the fact that messages do not arrive frequently is completely irrelevant. It's simply because Moxie -- someone likely to be immune to your kind of negativism -- has not seen fit to work on the problem, given that messaging with an asynchronous chat format fits the general trend of user adoption. Someday I suspect he'll come around on it, I hope.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by tptacek on Saturday January 06, 2018 @09:18PM (#16088706)
An individual server-to-server communication happens in milliseconds, but these systems layer on top of existing email clients, which do not have a polling interval of milliseconds.

I wouldn't hold your breath on email crypto from Moxie.

Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by lvs on Saturday January 06, 2018 @11:50PM (#16089242)
I don't think you know how Signal or the underlying protocol works based on this comment, so I'll just leave the discussion there. Feel free to read the specification. It's quite comprehensible and well-written.
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by tptacek on Sunday January 07, 2018 @01:16AM (#16089556)
Send message to server. Wait for server to tell you if the list of device-id's is current; if not, re-send with the server's update. What part of that works well with a client that checks for new messages every 5 minutes?
Re:Convenient End-To-End Encryption for E-Mail by blfr on Saturday January 06, 2018 @08:59PM (#16088636)
The problem is that you can't do it. More precisely, you cannot get people to convert to your encryption scheme. And if you could do it, you could as well convert them to a better protocol altogether.

At least this is how I understand tptacek's argument.