The most secure computer is powered off, enclosed in concrete 6 feet below the surface of the earth. It is not very useful though.
"100% secure" is unattainable, and to attempt to achieve it to the exclusion of all other concerns is probably a very bad idea.
If you’re not going to apply patches that close privilege escalation bugs, you might as well. You’re putting all your security eggs in one basket.
Then you didn't listen to DJB like 15 years ago. Moreso, your processes shouldn't be running under the same username. Principle of least user authorization people.
We know how Unix works. We’re telling you because you clearly are out of your depth. If you don’t understand that you have no business maintaining anything on the internet.
I also think that we need more information before we really see the long-term performance impact here. First, the patches will likely be optimized over time. Second, I am not sure that PTI needs to be run within guest kernels if the host already has the mitigation (effectively creating a double-hit from PTI in both the guest and host kernel), or that even if PTI is needed in both kernels now, that it will be needed long-term. We also need to figure out what type of Spectre mitigations need to be performed within the guest if the host system has the new microcode that selectively disables branch prediction.
The short answer is that it's going to take another 4-6 weeks before even the kernel devs have a firm grasp of what's useful/necessary to mitigate this and for things to settle into place, as Greg K-H blogged about earlier. At that point, we should have a more realistic perspective on the long-term performance impact.
Strongly disagree. No single defense measure is infallible and defense in depth has proven one of the most important topics in computer security.