Re:Intel Issues Updates to Protect Systems from Security Exp...
by jacques_chester on Thursday January 04, 2018 @11:41PM
(#16076603)
I've encountered this, with great unhappiness.
I have a theory that this heavily relates to the feedback loops and signals in play. New features are positively observable and their impact is observable from release onwards.
When defending against unknown unknowns, security is unobservable. It's observable only in its absence. All that's left are heuristics and synthetic signals like pentesting.
I wrote a multi-thousand word essay on the topic, but for an internal audience. I don't know if I could properly share it.
Re:Intel Issues Updates to Protect Systems from Security Exp...
by FullyFunctional on Friday January 05, 2018 @04:50PM
(#16082017)
Yes, that's exactly right and why it's hard to sell "security" and how we get to an voluminous x86 ISA.
My own speculation is that we got here in this industry though a complete absence of liability. Bugs are not a big deal, they are _expected_ now.
The only counter example I know of is Knuth's bug reward system.
We did. We, the people you called "paranoid" while we quietly try to fix things. We're the ones trying to make sure that people don't die when cyber vulnerabilities are exploited by shitty actors.