Re:LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
by eridius on Thursday January 04, 2018 @02:03PM
(#16073052)
AIUI the fundamental difference between Meltdown and Spectre is Meltdown involves speculating execution that loads memory across privilege domains and Spectre doesn't. If both AMD and ARM won't speculate memory loads across privilege domains, then it sounds like they're strictly immune to Meltdown.
Re:LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
by bsdetector on Thursday January 04, 2018 @03:07PM
(#16073599)
> main takeaway should be "speculative execution creates exploitable side-channels, and you should assume your hardware is exploitable until proven otherwise."
Speculative execution does not create side-channels in and of itself, side effects of speculative execution does that. In this case the side effect of cache state. Just don't change the cache during speculative execution and there's no problem.
Re:LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
by foota on Thursday January 04, 2018 @04:16PM
(#16074170)
Why can't the processor isolate those cache lines during speculative execution?
Re:LLVM patch to fix half of Spectre attack
by zacmps on Friday January 05, 2018 @12:09AM
(#16076704)
And roll them back? It can, but it doesn't for performance reasons. What the performance impact would be is unknown but this requires a silicon change so unless you work at Intel you'll probably never know.
If I were developing processors, I'd be having emergency meetings on trying to craft exploits to figure out where our processors' weaknesses are. While being happy that Intel is getting all the bad PR for this and I'm not.