I totally understand how the breaking out of the javascript sandbox attack works and the fact that IPT won't help with that. With Linux's clone(), you could clone without CLONE_VM and use CLONE_NEWUSER|SYSVMSEM and then unmap everything except the Javascript interpreter / JIT and leave a shared memory map and communicate only via the shared memory map and SYSV semaphores for synchronisation. Obviously this wouldn't be available on other platforms.
For variant 1, you would need to find some legitimate kernel code, accessible by syscall, that looks at least somewhat similar to the example in the Project Zero blog post:
if (untrusted_offset_from_caller < arr1->length) {
unsigned char value = arr1->data[untrusted_offset_from_caller];
unsigned long index2 = ((value&1)*0x100)+0x200;
if (index2 < arr2->length) {
unsigned char value2 = arr2->data[index2];
}
}
In practice, you may not be able to find something nice like "((value&1)*0x100)+0x200", but even if it simply used 'value' as an index, you would be able to at least narrow it down to a range. Other code patterns may work too (and potentially be more powerful?), e.g. conditional branches based on 'value'.For variant 2, see caf's answer to you in another thread.
The attack allows to read all the memory. Isn't there a way to scan for passwords or ssh keys and turn that into a privilege escalation?