Re:Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
by khc on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @07:56PM
(#16067028)
Link?
Re:Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
by language on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @08:43PM
(#16067295)
Text and patch start here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/3/780
Also, see Linus' response here: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/3/797
Re:Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
by Thev00d00 on Thursday January 04, 2018 @04:12AM
(#16068948)
Ahh Linus, never change.
Re:Reading privileged memory with a side-channel
by JdeBP on Thursday January 04, 2018 @06:14AM
(#16069456)
Discussed at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16066968
Subject: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Any speculative indirect calls in the kernel can be tricked to execute any kernel code, which may allow side channel attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data.
So we want to avoid speculative indirect calls in the kernel.
There's a special code sequence called a retpoline that can do indirect calls without speculation. We use a new compiler option -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (gcc patch will be released separately) to recompile the kernel with this new sequence.
We also patch all the assembler code in the kernel to use the new sequence.