Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat...
by rst on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @09:55AM
(#16052130)
One possible vector suggested by Matt Tait (pwnallthethings) on Twitter: if speculative operations can influence what the processor does with the cache, the results can be observed with cache timing attacks. If the branch predictor reads the results of speculative operations, it's real easy, as he suggests here:
https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/94797892728438374...
but (as he notes elsewhere) there are plenty of other channels in an Intel processor for information to leak...
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat...
by Taniwha on Wednesday January 03, 2018 @06:15AM
(#16060074)
my guess is that the cache tags or tlb entries loaded on failed speculative accesses are wrong (maybe the valid bit is set but the address wasn't changed, or the user/supervisor protections are munged), that could leave you with a cache line or page tagged as user accessible but really protected kernel data
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat...
by contrarian_ on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @10:52AM
(#16052517)
Perhaps an interaction with conditional branches and cache timing? You could then extract individual bits from privileged memory by having the CPU pull in specific cache lines as part of a speculatively executed branch on the value of the bit.
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat...
by zimmerfrei on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @03:48AM
(#16050737)
Could this be possibly fixed with a microcode update in the future (at least for most recent models for which Intel is still bound to some kind of warranty)?
Re:The mysterious case of the Linux Page Table Isolation pat...
by justincormack on Tuesday January 02, 2018 @04:05AM
(#16050794)
I think probably not, I think it may be too fundamental. But perhaps there is a mitigation if only a few instructions cause the leak and they can disable those in speculation. Performance hit could be bad though, worse than the Linux fix.
My wild guess is that you can read a good portion (if not all) of the memory (or a significant subset or trace of it) of the whole computer from unprivileged userspace programs.