Couldn't this be solved by just encrypting the email itself? Even the headers could be encrypted along with the body.
On the subject of fax machines, would they still be compliant if they're connected to a VOIP system?
Yes, but that's typically more cumbersome as you have to trade keys with everybody that needs an email. I wrote an emailer for a medium sized company and it sent about 500K emails and 500K faxes a month. That's a lot of key management.
You could use symmetric encryption, but then you give out the shared key to so many people, it tends to lose value, especially when you don't control how your recipient organizations protect the key. (it could be in a file on a shared folder named Email-EncryptionKey.txt).
On top of all that, each client will have to be taught how to decrypt (and encrypt) emails, either at the employee level or at the network admin level. Most provider organizations are small. Typically a doctor or two with a nurse and a couple people working the schedule and regulatory. In summary, it would achieve the objective but it's not ideal.
>On the subject of fax machines, would they still be compliant if they're connected to a VOIP system?
Yes, as long as no PHI went over an unencrypted channel and all servers are secured (physical and computational) and logged.
What would be needed is a public key infrastructure. If organizations like the state board of medicine could serve as a certificate authority for physicians licensed in that state (or maybe the DEA since they issue id numbers to physicians that are needed for controlled substance prescriptions), then the key management would not be as much of an issue. In other words, it shouldn't be handled by individual organizations; it should be handled by the authorities who are responsible for licensing doctors, nurses, pharmacists, hospitals, etc.
> On top of all that, each client will have to be taught how to decrypt (and encrypt) emails
This is certainly something that can be automated and shouldn't have to be a manual process. A plug-in for a program like Outlook should work in the vast majority of cases. That is, if the email is sent to the wrong address, then the recipient would only see encrypted text, but it would automatically be decrypted for the correct recipient.
Also, physicians themselves rarely send emails, they have office assistants do it. They are busy providing care. How would that work? The office assistant position doesn't have any direct regulation (that I know of) so you'd either have to have the physicians send out emails (ya right), have an assistant use the physician's account (oh no), or add a bunch of regulation to office assistants (to the tune of doctors and nurses) which would make them more expensive and make office visits more expensive (etc).
It sounds good as a technologist, but if you look for unintended consequences (costs), I'll bet there are a bunch I didn't even think of.
Also, organizations are highly motivated to get this right because the fines have teeth. Up to $50K per incident capped at $1.5 million per annum.
https://www.truevault.com/blog/what-is-the-penalty-for-a-hip...
They could encrypt those emails as well. While sending a non-encrypted email that contains PHI is a problem, sending an encrypted email that doens't contain PHI shouldn't be an issue (as long as the intended recipient can decrypt it, which they should).
> How hard would it be to shut down and create a new email for each employee that left, etc.
That comes down to revoking the certificate or using shorter intervals for the duration where the certificate is considered valid. For example, if the organization requires that one changes their password every 60 days, then a certificate should not have more than a 60 day period where it's valid.
> Would you have to have a special email server just for PHI and another for regular?
This wouldn't be server dependent. This would be dependent on the email client handling the encryption and decryption. The more that's automated, the less chance that there's a mistake with regards to email containing PHI.
> Also, physicians themselves rarely send emails, they have office assistants do it. They are busy providing care.
Physicians have to do all sorts of things like writing progress notes, dictating admission and discharge summaries, calling in prescriptions, writing orders, etc. The system they use could also be used to securely send PHI containing email to other physicians, pharmacists, or hospital systems.
But regulation could be a good incentive against physicians allowing others to use their account credentials to do things like sending PHI information to other organizations. No physician would like to be summoned by the board of medicine of the state they're licensed in over something like that.
But I think that a lot of the problems could be addressed by those who have cross-domain knowledge about technology and health-care (speaking as someone who went through medical school and subsequently changed fields to computer science/software development).
The current method is for insurance companies to install software on their SMTP server and that's about it. Much less overhead, much less chance of mistakes, much less cost to the physician's office, much cheaper overall and just as good for protecting PHI (since it's automated, no accidents).
Also, the vast majority of communication containing PHI is with insurance companies and the government, so your solution moves the onus of protecting PHI from the insurance companies to the small physicians, which I don't think is overly helpful.
Of course there is no way to really tell unless we complete vet it out and put cost associations with everything and do PHI leak risk assessments. I'm perfectly happy leaving this as a thought experiment though. :)
I would hope that they require TLS encryption for any connection to their SMTP server. Otherwise, any communication containing PHI could easily be intercepted. This also doesn't address the issue of securing the IMAP or Exchange and MTA server(s) that the sender uses to send the email to the insurance company.
> much less chance of mistakes
Unless the sender CCs a copy to another address where the MTA doesn't require TLS encrypted connections and doesn't have any such software installed on the MTA. That's why the solution I proposed (having the client program automatically encrypt the email before sending it and relying on PKI to handle decryption on the other end) would be more fool-proof since, even if the email was CC'd to another address, it couldn't be decrypted by the unintended recipient.
As for the cost argument, I think it could be implemented as a nominal cost on top of the costs that the physician already incurs in the process of applying/renewing their license, the practice license, etc (e.g. name, mailing address, telephone number, fax number, email address along with your PKI state board signed certificate).
> Also, the vast majority of communication containing PHI is with insurance companies and the government
Doctors have to communicate with other physicians outside of their group practice, hospitals they may not be affiliated with, and pharmacies. How is PHI communication in this context currently handled?
> Of course there is no way to really tell unless we complete vet it out and put cost associations with everything and do PHI leak risk assessments.
That is true. But I think that the technology we currently have to secure communication between clients and webservers (that allows us to do things like buy things online, interact with the bank, file taxes, etc along with client side certificates) should work perfectly well with PHI containing information. The problem is setting up the PKI for that type of communication.
Since governments, universities, and private companies have already done this, there's no reason why hospitals (especially university affiliated hospitals), state boards, and health care providers can't also do this.
Software intercepts any queued or targeted outbound email, then:
1. Replaces the body with a hyperlink to a web site and instructions, removing all PHI.
2. Hyperlink instructs recipient to login create account / login to view mail over SMTP.
3. Recipient logs into website (with TLS obviously) and reads email with PHI over secured channel.
4. Recipient can now read and reply using the website.
Pretty simple. As far as physicians communicating with each other and pharmacies, they typically use faxes and phone calls.That was the part I misunderstood. I thought it was for physician offices sending information to the insurance company.
> Pretty simple. As far as physicians communicating with each other and pharmacies, they typically use faxes and phone calls.
And that's an issue that could be addressed if all entities had a PKI set up such that they could communicate online regardless of application protocol used while maintaining compliance with HIPAA).
In a more wonderful world than what we live in today, the US government would have setup a simple, unreadable (even by them) secure channel for everyday citizens to be able to transfer sensitive data to verified businesses and other citizens. They can't see past the criminals using it to subvert the police though.
We pretty much already have that with the PKI system that web browsers (and other programs) check when verifying certificates for various websites we connect to (including this one). It doesn't require government intervention. It does require configuring servers that doctors, pharmacists, hospitals, labs, insurance companies, etc use to authenticate themselves with each other and a number of authorities to verify their identities (like the CA bundle that your web browser uses to verify that the server you connect to is indeed Hackernews and not some rogue entity).
PKI is a powerful tool which certainly can be used in a healthcare setting. Unfortunately, because of organization inertia, it's probably not going to happen (despite the fact that the technology behind it has been around for decades).
As an aside, it took a seismic event (the confirmation of mass government spying) to actually get it implemented properly, and the US government did file a few lawsuits about being able to openly break encryption with a back door. We're fortunate to still have it fully intact.
>It doesn't require government intervention. It does require configuring servers that doctors, pharmacists, hospitals, labs, insurance companies, etc use to authenticate themselves with each other and a number of authorities to verify their identities (like the CA bundle that your web browser uses to verify that the server you connect to is indeed Hackernews and not some rogue entity).
Yes, that's more in line with the solution that we implemented (well paid to have implemented) with the outbound email interception and website redirection. All PHI goes through TLS via the website.
>PKI is a powerful tool which certainly can be used in a healthcare setting. Unfortunately, because of organization inertia, it's probably not going to happen (despite the fact that the technology behind it has been around for decades).
Ironically, they use it heavily in integration from third parties. Their SFTP/FTPS was locked down. They use a login whitelist and PGP signatures for login, everything must be encrypted with asymmetric PGP keys, folders were locked down, the works.
Many of our larger clients requested that all email and fax correspondence go exclusively through those SFTP/FTPS channels. Smaller clients had difficulty handling that on their own and usually had to call in a local support guy eventually.
>PKI is a powerful tool which certainly can be used in a healthcare setting. Unfortunately, because of organization inertia, it's probably not going to happen (despite the fact that the technology behind it has been around for decades).
It certainly happens in the bigger companies. They don't mess around. It's the smaller companies that struggle with it because they don't readily have the expertise.
I suspect the reason faxes are compliant is a few:
1. Grandfathered in. 2. The number of unauthorized people that can see them is very limited (to whomever has access to the fax machine). 3. Modern fax machines print face down. 4. Data is in hard copy format which is more difficult to copy.
As an aside, modern fax machines are probably less secure than the old ones. Fax machines using digi-boards and databases and whatnot. The vast majority of US healthcare use faxes though.