Nobody would be going to jail... It's a relatively new technology, and legislation is already in place mandating it be universal by the end of 2018. I find difficulty in faulting either Amtrak or Sound Transit for not yet having 100% coverage -- both are actively rolling it out.
Outside of PTC, multiple safety protocols were violated, with responsibility likely falling to the Engineer and possibly Conductor. In systems not equipped with PTC, the engineer and conductor both are responsible for knowing the allowable speed for a given block of track, with the conductor being responsible for "enforcing" the safe operation of the train -- i.e. yell at, or even remove the engineer from the controls and/or initiate emergency braking.
(This is based on the way CSX operated when I was a freight conductor in '05. Obviously a decade later and a different railroad the responsibility hierarchy probably varies a bit, but I imagine it isn't terribly far off)
And what you’re saying is backwards thinking. The problem isn’t that the old way of driving trains isn’t perfect. We already know that.
The problem is we still have humans driving the trains. In 2017. It’s ridiculous.
In 2005, PTC was a technology found almost strictly in yards and on local or regional lines where a single railroad operated both the rolling stock and track infrastructure. Seeing that in 2017, 12 years later, Amtrak is at 49% coverage on locomotives, and 67% on track coverage, the situation (from a PTC deployment standpoint) seems hardly criminal.
Poland has an even simpler one, well used inductive ATS. German legacy system is similar. These are even deployed in Canada so not far. Are as old as 1900s. US has that old inductive system as well. If used right, it can control speed too.
US regulators foolishly allowed the railways to not install this basic protection. Similarly, timed trip stops are not used.
Interesting that you mention this. There was a similar fatal train crash in 2003 [1] - remarkably similar circumstances to this one - in which the driver had a heart attack, resulting in excessive speed entering a curve, derailment, and collision with a rock wall.
The organizational culture at the time considered the driver to be the one firmly in charge of the train. Also, the guard/conductor was not in the forward cabin with the driver, but at the rear of the train, a historical anachronism.
After this crash, there was an update to training and procedures that emphasised the guard's responsibility in braking the train if the driver neglected to or was unable to.
But I have a feeling that the money sucking industry selling a particular solution called "Positive Train Control" has managed to create some sort of undeployable monstrosity. And what we actually need is something completely different which costs virtually nothing to implement.