Yes.

> I wonder if there exists an authoritative mechanism similar to browser punishing rouge or incompetent CA

Not really. Although if you get a reputation for being notoriously problematic, the "big boys" - the large networks who are the responsible adults in this game might deny you service or stop accepting your announcements.

> I supposed the integrity and the authentication is achieved by implementing and deploying RPKI

RPKI doesn't really solve the issue. It validates only the initial announcer, so BGP hijacks can still occur. It would however help reduce hijacks due to mistakes in configuration.

Fifteen minutes later, half of Fairfax County is stuck in a routing loop, and we're getting calls from NOCs as far away as London asking us what the f* we're doing to their traffic.

That was the wild west: back then, a typo could (and sometimes did) actually take down The Internet. There's more filtering and checking and second-guessing today. But, ultimately, it's based on a web of trust model, you're right, with all the weaknesses that come with that.