These debates are less about a clear and present problem, than a mode of inquiry asking to look again at something "familiar" in a different way.
For example, ancient Greek philosophers made many speculations about the nature of atoms, and in some ways their guesses were correct, but I don't think that speculation was especially fruitful. But their advances in geometry and number theory were tremendously productive.
In terms of finding the actual answer (at least to the extent that we know the answer), it probably wasn't; but, in terms of suggesting that the question was one that had an answer, I think it was enormously fruitful. Leon Lederman's wonderful book "The God particle" persuasively (if perhaps slightly tongue-in-cheek?) argues a very direct intellectual through-line from the Greek analyses to (then-)current particle physics.
(Having said this, my personal feeling is that philosophy has done its part by expanding the scope of scientific inquiry, but probably doesn't have much to add to modern-day scientific discourse; but, then again, I am a scientist, and so am pre-disposed to believe in the primacy and importance of my discipline.)
At least physically, this seems wrong to me. Temperature is an emergent property of systems—there is no such thing as the temperature of an isolated particle—whereas (as spectral analysis shows) even individual atoms have colour.
Do you know what it looks like?
Can you imagine what it looks like?
Can Maxwell's equations predict what it looks like?The Problem of Color is a subset of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Both are uncharted territory. Maybe one day we'll have a half-decent theory of color. When that day comes, it will probably bud-off and begin a field of study distinct from "philosophy proper". Just like math and science budded-off. In the meantime, the only thing we can do is imagine and philosophize. Because we don't understand how to even investigate the problem, let alone solve it. We're still at the stage analogous to when the Ancient Greeks were debating whether matter is continuous or discrete. "Nobody knows for sure, but matter sure feels continuous to me."
The least we can do is demarcate our ignorance. Which is why blogposts like this exist. So when you (essentially) say "Our current theory of optics sounds perfectly satisfactory", you are defending the delusion the blogpost meant to correct. My two previous comments aren't meant to contribute a theory of color, but to make obvious that optics and color are not the same thing.
That's a good summary of what the article seems to be saying. But I still don't understand the reasoning behind that claim.
I mean, from the article:
But can this really be right? Focus on a colour in your immediate environment and ask yourself whether that could really be only a figment of your mind, or at best radically different from the way it appears.
Yes, obviously? What's the problem?
Somewhat analogously, there's a whole world of scent and pheromones that most animals perceive strongly, but we barely perceive at all. An entire sense that we don't even realise we're missing! I think that's fascinating, but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
The Soft Problem is easy to imagine. Neuroscience will solve it eventually. We may not understand it yet, but we can make a lot of computer analogies and educated guesses. After all, computers are already Philosophical Zombies (someone who passes the Turing Test, yet in no way experiences qualia).
> but it doesn't lead me to question the nature of reality in any deep philosophical way. Should it?
Here's the contention the professionals are currently debating. The Hard Problem challenges our notions of Physicalism (as opposed to say, Dualism). "But souls are dumb, Science says so!".
Extrapolate into the future. Even after Neuroscience solves the brain's circuitry, qualia will remain just as mysterious as ever. E.g. suppose we discover that the hippocampus demultiplexes memories to different parts of the brain. Suppose we learn how to directly manipulate memory. Not only can we fix amnesia, but we can implant false memories. "Hooray, we've solved the Soft Problem!". But we still have no leads on the Hard Problem. A hippocampus doesn't distinguish a Homunculus from a P-Zombie.
Physicalism has been so successful in the sciences, everyone takes its accuracy for granted. I myself consider Physicalism true. But Physicalism is not adequate to explain the Hard Problem. This doesn't mean we have to go back to souls. But it does mean we need to (at least) "spice up" Physicalism, or maybe choose another line of attack, etc if we're ever to crack the Hard Problem.
Neuroscience and computer science obviously haven't solved it either, but they have at least made some progress in understanding parts of the brain's structure, and gradually reproducing what we thought were uniquely human abilities with mindless computer programs. This suggests that "qualia" may not really be needed to explain consciousness (or at any rate thought); just as Darwin's theories showed why "god" isn't strictly needed to explain the diversity of animal species.
I agree there's still the niggling issue of "but why do I seem to experience stuff? Surely I'm not a mindless automaton!" There's also the problem of "but why does the universe exist in the first place?" But I don't believe philosophers have any particular insight or knowledge to bring to the first problem, any more than theologians have any real inside knowledge of the latter.
Explaining colour in terms of how objects reflect, refract or emit different wavelengths of light (and similarly for the rods and cones in our eyes) sounds perfectly satisfactory to me. What's the problem with that theory?
I really don't see the point of all the metaphysical stuff. It just doesn't tell you anything useful.