Re:The Problem of Colour
by analog31 on Wednesday December 13, 2017 @01:47AM
(#15912511)
The problem of qualia comes into play most especially when a materialist metaphysical position is accepted of the kind where the immaterial res cogitans is denied. The materialist is then faced with the task of explaining how all of that which was attributed to minds (e.g., color) -- and indeed minds themselves -- is really something that can be attributed to res extensa.
This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color.
I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.
This doesn't seem all that bad to me. I'm faced with the task of explaining lots of things that I don't understand for a variety of reasons. Sometimes I'm motivated to participate in the exploration, sometimes I'm willing to let it be delegated to others. This would seem to be true regardless of whether I think that the mind is material or immaterial. We may develop an elaborate theory of the immaterial mind, yet end up concluding that we still don't understand color.
I wouldn't trust myself to conduct research into the inner workings of an immaterial mind, without perhaps building up from a successful inquiry into simpler immaterial systems.