No, Bayesian decision theory does not allow you to reason in that way.
Suppose the amounts in the envelopes are A and B. A Bayesian would say:
Prob(I have A) = 1/2 and Prob(I have B) = 1/2
The expected gain from switching is:
Prob(I have A)x(what I'd gain from switching = B-A) + Prob(I have B)x(what I'd gain from switching = A-B)
which is: 1/2 x (B-A) + 1/2 x (A-B) = 0
Ah yes, this one can be solved that way; oops. My understanding of the literature is that variants are much more problematic, though, and require more complex restrictions on typical Bayesian probability frameworks to exorcise them.
This is one good review, with a proposed solution (from a Bayesian perspective): http://books.google.com/books?id=14_ykEOAZ6AC&pg=PA49
Frequentist probability doesn't let you do that, because it doesn't let you say "there's a 50% likelihood I'm in this state, and 50% that I'm in the other". Instead, it says you must be in one or the other state (non-probabilistically), and the probabilities are only attached to a previous process that generated that outcome. But Bayesian probability does let you interpret the probabilities as belief in each current state, so you have a 50% belief you're in one state, and a 50% belief you're in the other, and the value of any decision is thus 0.5 * value_if_I_was_in_situation_A + 0.5 * value_if_I_was_in_situation_B.
(If you don't allow that kind of computation, Bayesian decision theory has to be revised in some other cases as well.)