And you neglected a scenario 4: nobody is attempting to compromise my machine, but a buggy bit of USB code just crashed my system and took all my work with it.
Both 3 and 4 are mitigated by you saving your document often... it's not so bad, considering it can happen whatever you do.
Nowadays, Word is made to keep saving your change for that reason... They learned and designed it for the worst situation which is a whole system crash. If you can't handle that, well you aren't doing your work well.
Yes, of course we should save often, have decent backups, etc. But nobody is perfect and shit happens, and it'd be nice if the software you use didn't intentionally make it worse.
The IPv6 stack does a perfectly sensible and legal thing. The hardener code misunderstands the legal code, and causes a reboot.
That it was Linus is worried about -- often it is hard to tell the difference between "naughty" code which can never be a security hole, and genuine security holes.
They should all be fixed ASAP, but making code that previously worked make a user's computer reboot, when it is perfectly fine, is not a way to make friends.
That's not what Linus said though. What he said is:
> when adding hardening features, the first step should *ALWAYS* be
> "just report it". Not killing things, not even stopping the access.
> Report it. Nothing else.
and: > All I need is that the whole "let's kill processes" mentality goes
> away, and that people acknowledge that the first step is always "just
> report".
"Not killing things, not even stopping the access." Oh boy.(Also, the quotes I chose don't really help me make my case but I don't want to edit now since you've already commented on it. His first mail is way worse: https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/17/767)
Basically what I'm disagreeing with is that exploit mitigation's primary purpose is finding and fixing bugs. That's just not true. Its primary purpose is to protect users from exploitable bugs that we haven't found yet (but someone else might have).
1. 0-day in the kernel's USB code. You're part of stuxnet now.
2. 0-day in the kernel's USB code. You're part of stuxnet now. You also get a message that tells you how and where to report the bug that was exploited.
3. 0-day in the kernel's USB code. Your computer crashes. You're not part of stuxnet. You also get a message that tells you how and where to report the bug that was exploited.
Linus is wrong (it happens). Exploit mitigation techniques aren't debugging tools. They're exploit mitigation techniques. The fact that they also produce useful debugging information is secondary.