News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Tumblr transmits your Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo password in the... by tptacek on Wednesday August 04, 2010 @02:49PM (#1575407)
Re [2], it doesn't matter if a form's action posts to an https link. Using an unencrypted HTML form to post to an encrypted post handler is a security anti-pattern. Attackers will simply intercept the form render instead of the post, alter the form, and insert themselves in the middle of the transaction. This attack is no harder than intercepting the POST itself.

Don't ever give your Google Mail password to another company. Even if they "encrypt" it on the wire, you can never be sure they're not storing it insecurely on the back end. Please take this from someone who spends his days beating up other people's applications: everyone screws up something.

Re:Tumblr transmits your Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo password in the... by c1sc0 on Thursday August 05, 2010 @05:57AM (#1577643)
I agree, but will most people care?
Re:Tumblr transmits your Gmail/Hotmail/Yahoo password in the... by pasbesoin on Thursday August 05, 2010 @02:23PM (#1578851)
This is yet another comment that reminds me of what in my mind is a related problem. I encounter more and more sites, including major ones, that include insecurely delivered (http://) assets into their secured pages (https://). My understanding is that this is another vector to get at e.g. forms and cookies, or basically anything on the page; by intercepting the insecure asset, you can inject yourself into the secure parent page.

I always wonder "what's up with that"? Is it that the particular assets don't lend themselves to injection, or an assumption that items delivered from a server under their control can't or won't be intercepted? If the latter, particularly once the traffic hits an unsecured wireless segment, I'd be inclined to say all bets are off.

EDIT: Nit: HN linkified the bare protocol designations.