Recent browsers do protect against character spoofing in IDNs, and provide various UI features to make it easy to authenticate the domain name and identity. The same protection isn't applied to the rest of the URI, however.
Mozilla's Jesse Ruderman gave an interesting talk at the SOUPS conference on a similar class of attacks, some of which do not even require special characters - they are like SQL injection for the English language: http://www.squarefree.com/2010/07/14/untrusted-text-in-secur...
He has been shouting it from the rooftops. Tabnapping, which got on Reuters: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1376075
And an older trick, now fixed in Firefox: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=201912
If only that were true.
A payment gateway I stumbled across the other day (http://www.centricom.com/flashdemo/POLi_demo.html) gets the user to download an application which they use to log into their bank from. The intro video instructs the user to check the address bar and the lock icon in the fake browser they've just downloaded. The best part is that the payment gateway goes through all this so they can edit the HTML of the users bank and inject payment details.
One of the Australian airlines is pushing this instead of Paypal, and it's getting real world use.
Notable also as an example of an attack that the DNSSEC security model does little to combat.
One of the biggest security weaknesses on the Internet is in browser UI (something Aza Raskin should be shouting from the rooftops). Right now, users are "trained" (to dignify what's happening) to look at the browser URL bar for a name and a lock icon.
We don't need new protocols or even changes in old ones so much as we need Mozilla, Microsoft, Google, and Apple to sit down and come up with a standard set of UI idioms that will allow users to quickly and visually "authenticate" a domain name from the cues made available to the browser.