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Re:Towards Linux Kernel Memory Safety by lunixbochs on Thursday November 16, 2017 @01:52AM (#15710691)
> separated kernel and process address space

This already exists on x86_64 Linux in the form of SMEP and SMAP.

> With SMEP enabled, it’s no longer possible to map exploit payloads in userland, as the CPU will trigger a fault if it attempts to execute those user pages in kernel mode

http://vulnfactory.org/blog/2011/06/05/smep-what-is-it-and-h...

> SMEP can be used to prevent supervisor-mode code from unintentionally executing user-space code. SMAP extends this protection to reads and writes

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervisor_Mode_Access_Prevent...

These mitigations aren't overly novel at this point and don't prevent exploits (just complicates them). Here's a recent CVE PoC containing an SMEP and KASLR bypass: https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/blob/master/CVE-201...

Full memory safety takes this much further, and should be far harder to bypass.

Re:Towards Linux Kernel Memory Safety by StreamBright on Thursday November 16, 2017 @03:18AM (#15710977)
Good to know. I think there is no silver bullet in security so anything making exploitation harder is good.