We actually do, both when it is driven by rational (e.g., shifting money into a monopolized market) and irrational (encouraging time-deferred costs that people are known empirically to discount) forces.

> If rents just advance to capture the BI, all you've done is give a big subsidy to landowners.

But they can't, because UBI is a redistributive scheme; without price discrimination based on income before both UBI and the taxes funding it, you can't adjust rents to capture it.

"It's driven by rational and irrational forces" isn't an explanation.

>But they can't, because UBI is a redistributive scheme; without price discrimination based on income before both UBI and the taxes funding it, you can't adjust rents to capture it.

So you're saying the bridge scenario didn't and can't happen?

Nor was it posed as one, it is your condensation of my description (which also includes specific examples in each category) of broad classes of sources which we understand very well that produce the described effect.

> So you're saying the bridge scenario didn't and can't happen?

I was not saying anything about the bridge scenario, which is structurally unlike a UBI and thus a non-useful analogy. Though, sure, I would say that the bridge example reads a lot like more like a parable than a historical account, and politicians constructing such parables with weak, if any, factual basis is about as uncommon as ocean spray containing salt. More to the point, it's exactly about one f the specific examples I gave of effects we understand quite well.

Do you deny generally that rents go up with public infrastructure? Or that lifting a toll would raise rents (because it now becomes a more desirable place to live)? Or, which supply/demand curves do you think differ here from the UBI case?

They would go up; but, absent a perfect monopoly (which real property available for rent is usually not subject to in even the short term), it would be unlikely to go up the exact amount of the subsidy (considering only the effect of the subsidy).

> Or, which supply/demand curves do you think differ here from the UBI case?

The difference is that its a lot more plausible for residential rental property in a particular locality to be effectively monopolized than for that to be the national norm. And, to the extent the effect is under consideration is real, it is explicitly a monopoly effect.